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Abstract 
 
 
Africa has made tremendous progress over the past decades in its transition to democratic 
regimes. When evaluating the leverage such an enormous change has, and the haste Africa 
was in when making this change, the continent has been able to achieve a considerable 
amount of revision in their regimes. 
 
One fundamental aspect of a democracy is competitive Presidential elections. This has 
however shown to be a problem in Africa as many cases of violent elections have been 
reported on, with Nigeria’s 2011 elections being the latest example. The focus of this thesis is 
on the causal factors behind electoral violence in African democracies. More specifically, a 
comparative analysis of Kenya’s 2007 Elections and Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections is presented. 
 
The five possible causal factors under analysis are 1) free and fair elections, 2) international 
assistance, 3) political/electoral systems and 4) socio-economic factors and 5) ethnicity. 
Additionally, background information on the history of Kenya and Zimbabwe is presented. 
 
The research is conducted around the framework of one of the foremost African scholars in 
the field, Gilbert Khadiagala. His typology suggests two angles ‘In the first order of causes, 
electoral violence is the outcome of events and circumstances that emanate from broader 
political conflicts, particularly in societies that are beset by ethnic, communal and sectarian 
fissures. In the second category, electoral violence is a consequence of imperfect electoral 
rules; imperfections that allow some parties to manipulate elections through electoral fraud, 
vote buying, and rigging’ (Khadiagala, 2010:17).  
 
Next to this a discussion on Khadiagala’s fourth wave of democracy is analysed which proves 
of major importance for Kenya and Zimbabwe to prevent election violence. Not only because 
of the fact that the contemporary form of their democracies clearly show major flaws, but 
also because a democracy has proved to encourage socio-economic development.  
 
Firstly, the findings suggest that the people are fed up with stolen elections and they are 
demanding the free and fair conduct of elections. The use of violence is the means to express 
this ‘demand’.  
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Furthermore, in both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the land occupation of colonizers caused the start 
of deep social cleavages and ethnic tensions. In Kenya it is concluded that the cause of 
violence was not purely the flawed election process, this was merely a trigger for underlying 
ethnic tensions. In Zimbabwe in turn, the violence was mainly sparked by President 
Mugabe’s government who used extreme means to gain votes. The system was highly 
manipulated and due to weak institutions and electoral rules, President Mugabe was able to 
rig the elections.  
 
The role of international assistance is discussed and proves to be of little influence towards 
election violence. In the case of Zimbabwe, no international observers were invited, in the 
case of Kenya, international observers were invited and present. In both cases violence broke 
out.  
 
The establishment of a stronger socio-economic society proves vital for the development of a 
democracy. The connection between ethnic, social and economic differences to the electoral 
system recognizes that further deepening and strengthening of the democratic institutions 
needs to become a reality in order to conduct more peaceful elections. The elections are far 
from free and fair and as a result of weak democratic institutions the possibility of rigging is 
created. With the underlying ethnic tensions and broader political cleavages, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe proved prone to violence. 
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Opsomming 
 
 
Wanneer daar in ag geneem word dat Afrika onder moeilike omstandighede en in ‘n baie kort 
tydperk, beweeg het van meerderheid autokratiese state na demokrasieë, is dit regverdig om 
te argumenteer dat Afrika ‘n kenmerkende vordering gemaak het in die laaste dekades om ‘n 
demokratiese samenleving te berwerkstellig. 
Helaas, n fundamentele aspek van n demokrasie is die beoefening van gereelde en 
kompeterend verkiesings. Oor die jare is daar bewys dat verkiesings n problematiese aspek 
van demokrasie is in meeste Afrika state, meerderheid van verkiesings in Afrika is geneig om 
uit te loop in konflik en geweld. Dus is die fokus van die studie op die faktore wat bydra tot 
konflik gedurende n verkiesings tydperk in jong Afrika demokrasieë. Meer spesifiek sal daar 
n vergelykende studie gedoen word van die 2007 verkiesing in Kenia en die 2008 verkiesing 
in Zimbabwe.  
Die vyf faktore wat bydra tot konflik gedurende verkiesings is : 1) vry en regverdige 
verkiesings, 2) internasionale hulpvelening, 3) politiese en verkiesingsstelsels, 4) sosio-
ekonomiese faktore, 5) etnisiteit, word elk bespreek. Ook word die agtergrond van beide die 
verkiesings in Zimbabwe en Kenia bespreek. 
Die teoretiese aspekte van die studie is gebaseer op die werk van Gilbert Khadiagala, n hoogs 
ge-respekteerde kenner op die gebied. Sy teorie veronderstel dat konflik plaasvind as gevolg 
van politiek konflikte en etniese verskille. Tweedens, beweer hy dat verkiesingskonflik n 
produk is van foutiewe verkiesingsstelsels, veral waar een groep die ander groep kan 
manipuleer en waar bedrog moontlik is.  
Langs dit is 'n bespreking oor Khadiagala se vierde golf van demokrasie ontleed en  bewys 
dit van groot belang vir Kenia en Zimbabwe om verkiesings geweld te voorkom. Nie net as 
gevolg van die feit dat die demokrasieë duidelik groot foute toon nie, maar ook en meer 
belangrik, omdat 'n demokrasie sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling aanmoedig.  
Daar word gevind dat meeste mense eenvoudig keelvol is met ‘gesteelde’ verkiesings en dat 
hulle begin aandring op vry en regverdige verkiesings en konflik en geweld is die enigste 
manier om hulle wense te verwesenlik.  
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Ook, in beide Kenia en Zimbabwe het kolonialiseerders n groot skeuring veroorsaak tussen 
verskillende etniese groepe in beide lande, wat vandag voordurende etniese spanning 
veroorsaak. In Kenia blyk dit dat dit die etniese verskille was wat gelei het tot die 
verkiesingsgeweld in 2007 eerder as foutiewe verkiesingsstelsels. In Zimbabwe was dit 
verkiesingskorrupsie en President Robert Mugabe se oneerlike wyse van stemme werf wat 
gelei het tot konflik. 
Dit is aangetoon  dat die aanwesigheid van  internationale hulp min invloed het op 
verkiesings geweld.  In die geval van Zimbabwe, is daar geen internasionale waarnemers 
genooi nie en in die geval van Kenia, is daar wel internasionale waarnemers is genooi en was 
hulle daadwerklik aanwesig. In beide gevalle het geweld uitgebreek. 
Daar word gevind dat ‘n sterke sosio-ekonomiese sameleving  belangrik is vir demokratiese 
ontwikkling van ‘n land. Verder word daar geargumenteer dat sterk en onafhanklik politieke 
en demokratiese instansies bevorder moet word ten einde meer vreedsame verkiesings te hou. 
Tans in Afrika is verkiesings ver van vry en regverdig, gesamentlik met etniese spanning kan 
dit n plofbare situasie veroorsaak soos bewys in Kenia en Zimbabwe.  
The establishment of a stronger socio-economic society proves vital for the development of a 
democracy. The connection between ethnic, social and economic differences to the electoral 
system recognizes that further deepening and strengthening of the democratic institutions 
needs to become a reality in order to conduct more peaceful elections. The elections are far 
from free and fair and as a result of weak democratic institutions the possibility of rigging is 
created. With the underlying ethnic tensions and broader political cleavages, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe proved prone to violence. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Political violence in Africa is a highly researched topic. Academics, non-governmental 
organizations, international institutions, and so forth, have examined this phenomenon, which 
is vastly present throughout Africa. Electoral violence has, however, not received as much 
attention, even though since democratization in Africa, electoral violence has become the rule 
rather than the exception in many countries. The focus of this thesis will be on the causal 
factors behind the electoral violence in the cases of Kenya´s 2007 presidential elections and 
Zimbabwe´s 2008 presidential elections. 
This first chapter will provide a structured, detailed and comprehensive overview of the 
main research question of this thesis. Additionally, it will elaborate on the subject and 
provide background information, to some extent, to clarify the research beforehand and 
provide the reader with an overview of the upcoming contents.  
The outline will be as follows: the first section will outline the background and rationale 
of this study, after which in section two, the aim of the study will be presented. Section three 
provides a literature review and section four will elaborate on the identification and 
demarcation of the research question. Subsequently, section five will discuss the applied 
methodology. After this, the final section will present a conclusion, including a specification 
of the contents of the chapters presented throughout this thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 
Before commencing with the details of this research, the research question is first presented. 
The overall topic of this thesis is election violence in Africa; more specifically, however, the 
main research question is: Why have presidential elections yielded so much violence in Africa 
in particular? The causal factors of election-related violence will be researched by comparing 
Kenya and Zimbabwe; that is, the Kenya general elections of 2007, including both 
presidential and parliamentary elections, and the Zimbabwean presidential, parliamentary and 
Senate elections of 2008. 
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1.2 Background and Rationale 
 
Africa has witnessed many conflicts, including conflicts rising from ethnicity, religion, race, 
and/or natural resources. Conflict arising from elections is unfortunately also a well-known 
source of violence. Over the past years elections have caused violence in Zimbabwe, Kenya, 
Ivory Coast, Togo and Gabon, just to name a few. Not to mention the outbreak of excessive 
violence in April 2011 after the Nigerian elections; the violence cost the lives of some 800 
people and is reported to be the most violent in its history (Human Rights Watch, 2011).  
Deaths, hunger, disease and thousands of misplaced people are often the result of the violence 
and it is therefore crucial to examine what factors are involved in electoral violence in order 
to determine whether or not this could be prevented in the future. Additionally, aside from the 
harsh immediate consequences of election violence, in the long-run, elections promote 
democracy, peace and security, which all contribute to socio-economic development which is 
crucial for many African countries in order to establish healthy economies and/or the further 
development thereof. By determining the causal factors that promote electoral violence, this 
study serves as a base for further studies on how to possibly create circumstances for more 
peaceful elections, and improve democracies and electoral systems in order to conduct non-
violent election processes.  
The nature of this research will therefore be descriptive. Data will be gathered to become 
familiar with the basics, such as the history of the two respective countries and their current 
state of being. A set of factors will be presented and the sequence of these factors and their 
relation to electoral violence will be analysed. It will generate new ideas and explain both the 
elections from a comparative point of view.  Additionally, this comparative research will be 
of a qualitative nature. The strength of the study lies in its contemporary character. Both 
elections are fairly recent and will therefore represent the current state of affairs in respect of 
political systems and elections.                
                                          
1.3 Aim of the Study (Purpose) 
 
The main aim of this study is to identify causal factors that have promoted election violence 
in the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe during the latest elections, but a reflection on previous 
elections and possible violence connected to these factors will also be highlighted. This is 
done in order to determine if these causal factors were time and context specific, or if they 
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have featured during the elections repeatedly. These particular factors will be further clarified 
throughout section four. 
Secondly, many African countries have experienced numerous cases of political violence 
since their independence, and these cases have been researched extensively. The connection 
to electoral violence has, however, not received as much attention, even though it is a serious 
matter. The second aim of this study is therefore to contribute to the literature on election 
violence, and to clarify the concept of election violence and why it occurs in Africa.  
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
The following section will present a literature review.  Firstly, the literature on electoral and 
political violence will be presented; secondly, literature on the 2007/2008 Kenya electoral 
violence will be discussed, and thirdly the debate on election violence during the 2008 
elections in Zimbabwe will be presented. 
 
1.4.1 Electoral and Political Violence 
 
Both Kenya and Zimbabwe are no strangers to political and electoral violence. Although the 
focus of this thesis is on electoral violence only, electoral violence and political violence are 
inherently connected, with political violence being the umbrella under which electoral 
violence shields itself (FES and CCR, 2001:16). In other words, political violence can be 
viewed as a much broader concept, with it not only containing electoral violence, but for 
example, violence and opposition against the ruling government regarding rising food or fuel 
prices as well. Electoral violence in turn aims at the electoral process, its level of legitimacy 
or even to oppose unreasonable and unfair treatment of opposing parties.  
Gilbert M Khadiagala is one of the foremost African scholars on the topic of election 
violence. Khadiagala offers a suggestive typology of electoral violence: ‘In the first order of 
causes, electoral violence is the outcome of events and circumstances that emanate from 
broader political conflicts, particularly in societies that are beset by ethnic, communal and 
sectarian fissures. In the second category, electoral violence is a consequence of imperfect 
electoral rules; imperfections that allow some parties to manipulate elections through 
electoral fraud, vote buying, and rigging’ (Khadiagala, 2010:17). There thus exist two angles 
to election violence in Africa. This typology is considered of utmost importance for the 
subject at hand and will be extensively discussed throughout the thesis. 
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Electoral violence can be experienced coming from both the electorate as well as the 
government and/or running parties.  From a government point of view, as Mwagiru notes, ‘its 
tool of trade is the intimidation and disempowerment of political opponents. Election 
violence takes place not just at election time, but in periods leading to elections, during the 
elections themselves, and in the period immediately following elections such as during the 
counting of ballots’ (Mwagiru, FES, 2001:16). The time of the announcement of the final 
results, and therewith the winner of the elections, is emphasized as one of the most vulnerable 
times for election violence to break out.   
Basedau et al. (2007) indicate a clear relation between democratic transition and electoral 
violence. Huntington indicated already in 1968 that the gap between high levels of political 
participation and weak political institutions was a major source of political instability in the 
developing world.  Both Kenya and Zimbabwe are not fully established democracies. African 
countries are characterized by their ‘capabilities to design and implement coherent policies 
being limited and political power is personalised rather than embedded in political 
institutions’ (Basedau et al., 2007). They further emphasize that electoral violence can be 
initiated by the government, for example, by jailing opposition leaders or forcing the people 
to vote for their party by threatening them with violence, or by the people, for example, by 
protesting against the results. Furthermore, the timeframe of electoral violence, as indicated 
above, stretches from pre- to during to post-election periods. 
Fischer adds to this that ‘an electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means 
of achieving governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, 
or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go 
outside the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict and violence 
become tactics in political competition’ (Fischer, 2002:2). Additionally, Fischer argues that 
violence is not a result of an electoral process, it is rather the breakdown of an electoral 
process. 
Höglund argues for a conceptualization of electoral violence as a specific sub-category of 
political violence, determined mainly by its timing and target. ‘The enabling conditions and 
triggering factors can be identified in three main areas: 1) the nature of politics in conflict 
societies, 2) the nature of competitive elections, and 3) the incentives created by the electoral 
institutions’ (Höglund, 2009:2). 
In sum, professionals have been writing noticeably on political and electoral violence. For 
the purpose of this thesis, the above will be taken into account and a conceptualization of 
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electoral violence will be introduced in the second chapter of this thesis, also elaborating on 
scholars who represent African views. 
 
1.4.2 Kenya 
 
The 2007 general elections in Kenya have been widely researched and analyzed. The 
violence was horrific, leaving 1,500 Kenyans dead and some 300,000 displaced. President 
Emilio Mwai Kibaki was re-elected in the 2007 elections, although it was publicly confirmed 
by several international institutions that elections were not free and fair, but rigged and 
manipulated. 
Before attempting to elaborate on the 2007-2008 elections, Anderson analyzed violence in 
Nairobi in 2002 and emphasizes the ethnic struggle between the Taliban and Mungiki 
(Anderson, 2002: 531). Additionally, he presents the, already then, increasing prevalence of 
vigilante groups in the city of Nairobi. These vigilante groups in turn represent a growth in 
criminal activities, especially extortion. The issue of ethnicity is ever present in everyday life 
in Kenya and it has been appointed as a reason for the outbreak of violence. However, in a 
survey done by the Waki Commission – which investigated the post-election violence in 
Kenya – Kenyans define themselves in terms of national identity and not in terms of 
ethnicity. Important to add though, is that the Commission found a steep decline in 
perceptions of tolerance between different ethnic groups (Rheault and Tortora, 2008). 
Smith argues in her Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya that 
the violence is due to a lack of constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of 
multi-party politics in the early 1990s. ‘Electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of 
politics and therefore led to significant and escalating political violence’ (Smith, 2009: 867). 
Cheeseman additionally highlights how fragile Africa's new multi-party systems may be 
when weak institutions, historical grievances, the normalization of violence, and a lack of 
elite consensus on the 'rules of the game', collide (Cheeseman, 2008). Roberts agrees with 
this by stating that the roots of the violence were in a weak national constitution. ‘This 
constitution has progressively lacked a healthy checks and balances system between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government’ (Cheeseman, 2009: 2). 
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1.4.3 Zimbabwe 
 
As in the case of Kenya, many articles have been written on the 2008 presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe. On 2 May 2008, election results indicated that, for the first time since 
independence, the ruling party had lost its majority in the National Assembly.  Opposition 
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, had gained more votes then President Robert Mugabe, but had not 
gained the 50 percent needed to avoid a run-off (CRS Report for Congress, 2008). In the 
following run-off, President Mugabe had a strong majority of the votes. Mugabe’s initial loss 
was unacceptable to him and a wave of violent election campaigning, or rather election 
intimidation, towards the run-off elections followed. 
In When Elephants Fight, Matlosa et al., argue that in Zimbabwe ‘national-level 
mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of violent election-related 
conflicts are weak and ineffective’ (Matlosa et al., 2010: 216). This is thus indicated as one 
of the factors which could have contributed to a more peaceful electoral process. 
Additionally, suspicion of a partisan administration of the elections and buying of votes were 
widely discussed. Although President Mugabe let some international observers enter the 
country, such as the African Union, only those who would not be critical were allowed to 
observe. This in turn raises major concern that Africa’s observer missions have become 
rubberstamps. In other words, these missions endorse elections which are clearly flawed. 
Furthermore, several international journalists were arrested and jailed for numerous weeks.  
The Democratic Alliance (DA), a South African political party, although forbidden to 
observe, reports on malpractice of the government in the run up to the election. The 
cancellation of rallies organized by the opposition, and even proof of torture and physical 
abuse of opposition members, are two examples of an unfair electoral process (DA, 2008:4). 
These are all factors which could have contributed to the severe protests ending in electoral 
violence. 
The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) reports that one of the 
major factors contributing to unrest and violence in Zimbabwe was the delay of the 
announcement of the election results; the results were only presented five weeks after 
election day (www.eisa.org). Additionally, unfair distribution of broadcasting minutes, 
meaning a biased media in favor of President Mugabe, was reported. 
Lastly, Zimbabwe has a fierce ethnic background which in the past has caused major 
conflict situations. The Ndebele, Mashona and a white population are the main ethnicities. 
President Mugabe is Mashona and has attempted to oust and destroy the white population by 
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having their farms attacked. In turn, this caused a major drop in food production, and 
therewith poverty. The consequences thereof and the connection to election violence will be 
elaborated on in Chapter Four as it is considered a factor behind electoral violence in 
Zimbabwe.   
 
1.5 Identification and Demarcation of the Research Question 
 
As mentioned above, the main research question is: Why have presidential elections yielded 
so much violence in Africa in particular? The causal factors of election-related violence will 
be researched by comparing the sequence of events between the two case studies of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. More specifically, the Kenyan presidential elections of 2007 and the 
Zimbabwean presidential elections of 2008 will be examined. 
The Kenyan presidential elections were held on 27 December 2007. The Zimbabwean 
presidential elections, along with parliamentary elections, were held on 29 March 2008. As 
electoral violence is central, both pre- and post-election violence will be researched. The 
timeframe for both elections will be from three months prior to the respective elections to 
three months after the respective elections. This is crucial as, for example, speculations were 
made that the Kenyan electoral violence made the Zimbabweans nervous and on the edge 
prior to their elections.  
Although the main research question entails the continent of Africa, it is acknowledged 
that no one country is representative of the whole continent. As the cases of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe show many similarities and elections were held only three months apart, these two 
countries demarcate the territories examined. 
The main factors which will be examined have been chosen because of their strong 
relation to the research question and will mainly consist of: 1) free and fair elections, 2) 
political/electoral system, 3) international assistance, 4) socio-economic factors and 5) 
ethnicity. Supplementary to these factors, factors such as (colonial) history and independence, 
amongst others, will be taken into account. The main questions behind the choice of these 
factors are questions such as: Was or was there not international assistance present and what 
was its effect? What was the respective ethnic situation, and how did this affect the outbreak 
of violence? Was the perception of the elections by the people to have been free and fair? 
Although these are merely examples and many more are subject to discussion, these 
questions indicate the line of thought and will be discussed further throughout this thesis. The 
motivation to study these specific factors is mainly based on research on the topic which 
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proved the relevance of these factors, this is further elaborated on in the literature review. 
Additionally, the mixture of quite straightforward institutional factors – the first three – as 
well as the socio-economics and ethnicity which are more non-institutional factors, provide 
for a balanced research. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, the nature of the research to be conducted is qualitative. The methods 
used to provide for a comprehensive analysis will be based on literature and will be 
descriptive. An historical overview of both countries will be provided, and existing data and 
literature will be discussed. The sources which will be studied range from books, to articles to 
up to date data retrieved from the World Wide Web. Khadiagala’s line of thought will be 
central to this study. 
Literature will be approached ranging from African politics, to local politics, from 
Zimbabwean literature to Kenyan literature, from the role of the international community to 
the role of the regional community and so forth. The causal factors of election violence in 
Africa will be research by the comparative method as Kenya’s 2007 elections and 
Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections will be studied and compared.  Additionally, a section will be 
dedicated to clarifying the main concepts behind the subject of this thesis. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
Peace and conflict are central to this research, and more specifically, elections as a cause for 
unrest, violence and conflict in Africa. The fact that election violence is still so present in 
Africa is a worrying one and this thesis will therefore focus on the causal factors behind the 
violence.  
Why have presidential elections yielded so much violence in Africa in particular? This is 
the research question addressed in this thesis and an outline of how this question is going to 
be addressed is presented below. The two chosen cases, as explained above, will be the 2007 
Kenyan presidential elections and the 2008 Zimbabwean presidential elections. The selected 
case studies have experienced similar election periods, and it will be determined what 
contributed to the violence in either one.  
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The comparative character of the study will provide for an excellent base to discover 
causal factors of election-related violence, as well as potential similarities in the 
circumstances. 
In order to provide for a structured and clear thesis, the following outline will be applied 
throughout this research. 
Chapter One introduces the research topic and question. A general introduction is given, 
including the aim of the study, the background and rationale, and the demarcation of the 
research question is also presented. Additionally, a literature review discusses the main issues 
offered so far by academics and other professionals.  
Chapter Two presents a conceptualization and the theoretical basis for this study. In the 
conceptualization, the main concepts will be highlighted and clarified in order to prevent 
confusion. When applicable, the concepts will also be contextualized.  
Chapter Three will give an overview of the Kenyan 2007 presidential elections. This 
chapter will provide a discussion on the five causal factors appointed above in order to, in 
Chapter Five, analyse and compare the factors to Zimbabwe. Moreover, additional 
background information, such as historical factors and economic development, will be 
provided when necessary. 
Chapter Four, in turn, will present the case of the Zimbabwean 2008 presidential 
elections, including the same aspects as in the case of Kenya.  
Chapter Five offers the core analysis of this thesis. The discussed matters in the third and 
fourth chapters will be subject to a comparative analysis. In this chapter, similarities, 
differences, trends and so forth will be highlighted. 
Chapter Six offers a conclusion in which the main findings are presented. 
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Chapter Two: Conceptualization and Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Before presenting the conceptualization and theoretical piece of this thesis, the following 
introduction regarding democracy is given. This is considered crucial to this thesis as, 
although democracy is not a causal factor of election violence, the transition to democracy 
has had an impact on the current state of affairs. Not only because of the difficulties which 
have been encountered during transition, but also the painfully slow process of it in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. Therefore, in this section the term democracy will firstly be clarified; 
secondly, the transition of African countries to democracies will be highlighted, after which 
lastly, Khadiagala’s argument on the fourth wave of democracy in Africa will be presented. 
Accordingly, this discussion on electoral democracy is included to establish a wide-ranging 
overview. 
Democracy is a term with many different types and interpretations, but as Abraham 
Lincoln once stated, democracy is ‘government of the people, by the people and for the 
people’. In other words, a democratic regime is considered to be ‘rule of the people’. The 
term is, however, somewhat complicated as it leaves much room for interpretation. For 
example, who are the ‘people’ or what is ‘rule’. Birch even concludes that ‘we cannot arrive 
at an objective and precise definition of democracy’ (Francis, 2008:150). It is additionally a 
collective term for a wide variety of regimes, such as liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, 
radical democracy, direct democracy and moderate democracy. One important feature of a 
democracy that is certainly part of the definition is that in order to actually be a democracy – 
aside from the type of democracy – the regime should be free and fair. 
The concept of democracy is a highly contested one with many different meanings and 
approaches given to it. Democracy theory is in turn an extensively discussed theory. Rather 
than one theory though, Robert Dahl observes that there is no single theory of democracy, 
only theories. There is no single truth and in the case of Africa this is especially true, seeing 
the different levels of democracy; for example, the level of democracy in South Africa is 
more developed than in Uganda, although both countries call themselves democracies. 
Theorists of democratization have further noted three phases in the process of turning 
authoritarian regimes into democratic regimes. These are ‘a) the phase of liberalisation and 
‘political opening’; b) the transitional phase; and c) the phase of consolidation’ (Souare et al., 
2008:6). Although the above phases might not represent clear-cut phases, they do represent 
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guidelines to measuring or analysing in which level of democratization a country finds itself. 
Democratization is not a process which can be fulfilled overnight. It is a change in mind-set, 
governance and lifestyle for not only the people of a country, but especially also for the 
governing authority. Here also lies the reason why, multiple times, state leaders have found 
ways to introduce a façade democracy whilst still holding onto their endless power and 
keeping to the rules of the game in the former authoritarian regime using their endless power. 
In Kenya, but especially Zimbabwe with Mugabe being in power for more than three 
decades, one could question whether or not a true democracy exists or that in both cases it 
indeed is more a façade democracy. 
There exists a debate, however, whether it was the Western world that brought democracy 
to Africa or whether it already existed. Kabongo argues that democratic systems have 
functioned in Africa in the past (pre-colonialism) and are functioning in the present. After 
which he concludes that therefore democracy is not intrinsically alien to African people 
(Kabongo, 1986:35). Some scholars also argue that democracy is certainly prevalent in 
Africa, merely in a different form and standard to Western democracies. The African 
democracy is accordingly based on African democratic concepts, the so-called ‘village 
democracy’. Gebrewold identifies three problems with this; ‘first, this palaver democracy 
mainly consists of men; second, the political system during the palaver democratic system is 
different from the ‘modern’ state based political system; third, those who try to sell palaver 
democracy as the African way of democracy intend to prove to the Western world the 
‘African democratic civilization’ and to disprove the Western superiority complex’ (Francis, 
2008:150). One thing is clear; democracy – when and if implemented correctly – prevents 
violent outbreaks, as stated by Fischer and further highlighted below. Some African and non-
African scholars have argued that Africa is not ripe for democracy because of all the violence 
surrounding the process. 
In Odugo’s book Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 21st Century it 
becomes clear that even African students on democracy and African scholars are troubled by 
the democratization process and the analysis thereof. Herbst notes that, ‘Unfortunately, faced 
with regimes that are obviously more liberal than their authoritarian predecessors but that 
have profound flaws, such as too powerful militaries, elections that are not always free, and 
democratic "deficits" in the way they make laws, which make them problematic as full-
fledged democracies, analysts have resorted to a bewildering array of adjectives and 
qualifiers to modify the meaning of democracy. For instance, ‘semi’, ‘quasi’, ‘real’, 
‘popular’, ‘no party’, ‘participatory’, ‘limited’, ‘liberal’, ‘non-liberal’, ‘incomplete 
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metamorphic’, ‘ambiguous’ and ‘orientata’ have all qualified democracy in just the titles of 
recent articles on African liberalization’ (Herbst, 2001:358). Udogu in turn argues that the 
form of democracy in Africa is inherently different from the Westernized form of democracy 
and that Africa may be on its way to developing its own form of democracy. Mamdani 
complements this by stating that Africanists are ‘akin to a person learning a foreign language 
who must translate every new word back into his/her mother tongue, in the process missing 
precisely what is new in the new experience’ (Udogu in Herbst, 2001:358). 
Related to the eventual establishment of a consolidated democracy is the level of 
successful electoral contestation. The registration of voters and parties, campaigning, voting 
and the declaration of the winner or winners are all processes that are to be regulated and 
adhered to. It is often contested that although Africa, in theory, is democratic, the transitional 
process in many countries is lacking the constitutional and electoral reforms in order to fully 
consolidate. As Khadiagala (2010:15) argues, ‘since most of the democratic breakthroughs of 
the 1990’s had been hastily organized few countries had precious time to institutionalize 
sound procedures for popular governance. Furthermore, although elections had become 
central instruments for political transformation less attention had been devoted to building 
sturdy rules and institutions that would promote organized and predictable competition’ The 
electoral democracy’s most significant feature clearly is the principle of elected individuals 
representing the people. The quantity versus the quality of the elected individuals is, 
however, a major debate. Zimbabwe, for example, is very precise with election dates; 
however, the quality of the elections is poor. Even though elections might thus take place on 
a regular basis, proper procedures and institutions to adhere to the regulations of a democratic 
system are often lacking. Proper constitutional reforms are vital to understanding the context 
of electoral violence, seeing the current state of affairs in Africa seems to portray 
democracies without liberal institutions. Relating back to the façade democracy, the quantity-
quality debate is an interesting one. Zimbabwe, for example, is officially an electoral 
democracy. By holding elections on such a regular basis, it might seem as if the country 
indeed is a true democracy. The quality of these elections, however, indicates the low level of 
developed and true democratic regulations as they are highly suspect and compromised.  
Having presented background information, the focus will now be on the possible fourth 
wave of democratisation in Africa. Further elaboration on electoral contestation will also be 
presented. Firstly, Huntington’s three waves of democratization will be highlighted, after 
which, Khadiagala’s work on a fourth wave will be discussed. 
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Samuel Huntington has studied and examined the transition to democracy of about 30 
countries. He has additionally appointed three different waves in which these transitions 
happened. The first one took place from 1828 to 1926 and is considered to be a long one. 
This first wave occurred mainly in Europe where the monarchies switched to democracies. 
However, he also studies a reversal of it, between 1922 and 1942, when dictatorial regimes 
were dominant in Europe. The second wave took place from 1943 to 1962 and is considered a 
short wave. In this period Africa and Asia were decolonized; yet again a reversal was seen in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The third wave started in 1973. 
 
„Five major factors have contributed significantly to the occurrence and the timing of the 
third-wave transitions to democracy: 1) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian 
regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent 
dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain 
"performance legitimacy" due to economic (and sometimes military) failure, 2) The 
unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, 
increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries, 3) A 
striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second 
Vatican Council of 1963-65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from 
defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism, 4) Changes in the policies of 
external actors, most notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union, 5) "Snowballing," or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave 
in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization‟.  
(Huntington, 1991:3) 
 
Democracies thus improve economic growth, living standards, educational opportunities, and 
reduce violent acts. Put even stronger, democracies will not go to war with each other based 
on the proven liberal democratic peace. Africa started to experiment with democracy at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The third wave of democratization has resulted in mixed outcomes 
for Africa. On the one hand, elections did increase the number of democracies in Africa. 
Between 1989 and 1994, 38 African countries held competitive elections. Additionally, 
between 1995 and 1997, another 11 countries followed. However, on the other hand, these 
democracies emerged without fundamental alterations to the rules that supported pluralism 
and liberalism. Electoral violence in turn reflects this mixed legacy of the third wave 
(Khadiagala, 2010:13). 
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Even though this development seemed plausible at the time, in later years it showed its 
serious flaws. Many of the African democracies were pressured, both from external actors as 
well as internal actors, into the transformation process. ‘Forced to adapt to the new order, 
regimes of every stripe latched onto elections, not as instruments of political change, but for 
the most part, as a means of postponing significant political reforms that would lead to 
genuine political competition (Khadiagala, 2010: 14). As mentioned, another negative 
consequence of this was that because of this pressure that many countries experienced to 
reform, not much time or attention was given to institutionalize sound procedures. In other 
words, procedures, firm rules, regulations to ensure a free and fair process and other crucial 
basic regulations for a democracy to function, were not implemented. No liberal institutions 
were erected.  
Khadiagala further provides for two angles to look at Africa’s election violence. On the 
one hand, he argues that the electoral violence at the different stages during the electoral 
process could be caused by profound divisions inherent in Africa’s polities and socio-
economic systems, or whether it, on the other hand, signals the transitional teething problems 
of building better electoral management systems.  
A fourth wave of democratization is suggested by Khadiagala. Both in theory as in 
practice, proven by several cases of election violence, African democracies need to deepen, 
strengthen and legitimize their electoral process. Electoral violence constitutes a crucial 
contribution to the pressures that may be critical to the evolution of the creation of 
constitutional rules for future stability. The effects of election violence are on the forefront of 
a potential fourth wave of democratization of the continent because the people themselves 
start to demand fair elections. As the impact of election violence is becoming more and more 
visible and widespread to the people, the urgency for improving the democratic systems is 
underlined.  Additionally, the aftermath of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean elections makes 
African voters more conscious, mindful and attentive towards their rights. The violence that 
erupted in these two African countries might not stop the governing authorities from 
controlling outcomes and rigging elections, but it is a clear signal that people are showing 
their grievances about stolen elections. Such a citizenry ties the hands of the elite and is one 
of the foundations of constructing legitimate institutions to control the electoral process. 
Furthermore, other African countries see the damages done in the case of rigged elections and 
lessons are learned. The avoidance of failed elections will be more plausible after having 
witnessed the great damage. 
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The fourth wave of democratization suggested by Khadiagala thus contends that although 
Africa is democratic, the system is not implemented fully, nor working properly. Africa is not 
100 percent democratized, but needs further deepening and strengthening of its democracy in 
order to mitigate violence surrounding elections. The vital question accompanied by this 
statement is of course whether or not a democracy can truly be fully consolidated.  During the 
2000 elections in the United States of America it even showed that imperfect rules exist in 
full-blown democracies with solid constitutional frameworks. The state of Florida, however, 
managed to avoid electoral violence although it was evident that the electoral rules were 
manipulated, which proved the solidity of its institutions to manage the uncertainties 
surrounding an election. Furthermore, the state of Florida recognized the flaws in the system 
and launched significant reforms to change them.  
With the above as an important overview of Africa’s democratization process in mind, the 
following section of this chapter will now present a conceptualization. The main concepts 
which will be used will be clarified and put into context. These main concepts are electoral 
violence, free and fair elections, international assistance, political/electoral system, socio-
economic factors, and ethnicity.  
Secondly, after this, section two of this chapter presents the various strands of research, 
typologies and the classification used throughout this thesis.  
 
2.2 Conceptualization 
 
2.2.1 Electoral Violence 
 
Electoral violence can be approached from two angles; from the people and from the 
governing authority. In other words, when referred to top-down violence, it is violence from 
the governing authority towards its opposition parties or its people, when referred to bottom-
up on the other hand, it is the people violently protesting towards the governing authority.   
Firstly, Khadiagala et al. state that ‘electoral violence reflects the absence and/or the 
distortion of rules for orderly competition. In recent years in Africa, as elections have become 
the main legitimate means of power acquisition, the stakes have increased alongside the 
escalation of electoral violence’ (Khadiagala, 2010:17). 
From a top-down perspective, Egwu explains that ‘the main purpose of electoral violence 
is to eliminate or neutralise opposition and to facilitate the commission of electoral fraud 
(Khadiagala, 2010: 94). It takes on different forms, examples of which are electoral violence 
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in the form of intimidation of voters – either physiological or physical – or the bullying of 
officials to persuade them to manipulate and falsify results. 
From a bottom-up perspective it can be viewed as the people violently protesting against a 
rigged system, a false outcome or favouritism. The destroying of property is an example of 
violence used by the people when protesting against their governing authority. 
The European Commission, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) define electoral 
related violence as ‘acts or threats of intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an 
electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition’ (Khadiagala, 2010:94). 
An important aspect not to be forgotten is that an electoral process actually is an 
alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance. ‘It is when an electoral 
process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is 
compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve 
their objectives (Fischer, 2002:2). Fischer then continues to define electoral violence ‘as any 
random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a 
political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral 
process’ (2002:4). 
Sisk (2008:5-6), in his Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence, defines 
electoral violence as ‘acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to 
affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. When  
perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process 
of elections – such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll – and to influence the 
outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure 
approval or disapproval of referendum questions’. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the definition used by the International Foundation for 
Election Systems’ Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) programme will be 
the leading conceptualization highlighted in this thesis: ‘Election violence is any random or 
organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political 
stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process’ 
(UNDP, 2008:4). The outbreak of electoral violence is thus a broad concept with many 
factors of influence. One of these factors studied in this thesis is free and fair elections. The 
next section will elaborate on the concept of free and fair elections in order to fully 
comprehend this factor. 
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2.2.2 Free and Fair Elections 
 
An election that is popularly seen as fraudulent – not free and fair – is more likely to attract 
post-election violence. Free and fair elections can only be conducted ‘using instruments that 
are accepted by the role players. Electoral systems must be regarded as above board and 
uncorrupted by any player, especially the incumbent’ (Khadiagala et al., 2010:52). Another 
important note on the key components of a legitimate electoral process is made by Sisk 
(2008:16) who argues that it ‘is one that is free and fair in both political and administrative 
terms, that is inclusive of all elements of society through a well-considered law of citizenship 
and of voter registration, and that offers meaningful choices to the population. 
In the report Promoting Free and Fair elections, Tlakula addresses the two concepts of 
free and fair separately. Firstly, he states that ‘for an election to be free, citizens must have 
the right and opportunity to choose. There must be freedom of assembly, association, 
movement and speech – for candidates, parties, voters, media, observers and others’ (2011:3). 
Secondly, ‘to be fair, an election must have honest voting and counting, administered without 
fraud or manipulation by impartial election authorities. Political parties and individuals must 
have reasonable opportunities to stand for election, and there must be prompt and just 
resolution of election-related disputes and grievances, before and after Election Day’ 
(2011:3). Closely related to this concept is the concept of international assistance which will 
now be discussed. 
 
2.2.3 International Assistance 
 
International assistance aims at international observers, meaning outside or foreign experts 
who are objective and neutral to overlook the election process. Whenever fraud is committed, 
corruption is noted or any other type of ‘unfairness’ is identified in the electoral process these 
observers will highlight this and report on this. In a way one can see international assistance 
as a means of mitigating the risk of election violence. The trouble with international 
assistance is that international observers are often not allowed into the country. Or if they are 
allowed in, they are only allowed limited access to election procedures, leaving space for 
rigging. Put even stronger, ‘in many cases the countries conducting elections do not even 
bother to invite international observers, who would in any case be unlikely to come, for fear 
of being seen as endorsing the elections’ (Elklit and Svensson, 1997:41). The down-side of 
the coin here is that, as mentioned above, it becomes more and more common that 
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observation missions that do enter the country merely act as a rubber stamp. This has an 
adverse and undesirable effect as the observer mission more or less endorses flawed 
elections.  
The United Nations (UN) has demarcated three types of international assistance: technical 
assistance, election observation and other assessments, and organization or supervision of 
elections. The first, technical assistance, mainly ‘covers a wide range of short and long term 
expertise provided to national authorities in charge of administering elections in their 
country. Advice and support are provided in all sectors of electoral administration’ (UN, 
Types of Assistance, 2011). This type of assistance has positively developed over the past 
years and consists of assistance in the form of, for example, the review of electoral laws and 
regulations, electoral dispute resolution, voter registration and electoral administration and 
planning. The second type, election observation and other assessments, responds to requests 
for the United Nations to assess or even validate the integrity of an electoral process. ‘These 
mandates are rare. They can be an additional tool for national actors to overcome a 
confidence crisis in an electoral process, and provide interested UN organs with an 
assessment of the process for their future deliberations’ (UN, Types of Assistance, 2011). The 
third type, organization or supervision of elections, is very rare. In this case, the UN may be 
fully in charge of organizing elections of a member state. This type has been used in the past, 
but overall the UN has a supporting task and this would only be applied in highly insecure 
situations during transition periods (UN, Types of Assistance, 2011).  
The assistance provided by the UN is crucial to the development of a solid political and 
electoral system. This in turn is beneficial to the well-being of the particular state, not only 
because its political institutions will be more solid, but also because ‘only when new 
legitimate political institutions have been established will the international presence be 
reduced’ (Hӧglund, 2009: 414). Transparency and accountability in political and electoral 
systems can influence the outbreak of violence. The next section will further highlight this.  
 
2.2.4 Political and Electoral System 
 
The political or electoral system will now be touched upon briefly. The electoral system 
design is central to understanding the prevalence of violence in some societies and among 
certain actors. For instance, ‘it has been argued that in systems where a small number of votes 
can make a big difference on the outcome of the election, such as first-past-the-post 
arrangements, violence is more likely to occur’ (Hӧglund, 2009:422).  
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Electoral systems define the rules of the game – how elections are won and lost. The system 
represents the basic parameters of the electoral law and the boundaries of representation and 
inclusion (in Africa this is often with reference to the different ethnic groups represented in 
the ruling authority). ‘Africa has a range of electoral models that include variations of the 
first-past-the-post (FPTP), proportional representation (PR) and mixed member 
proportionality (MMP) electoral systems, which provide different degrees of representation, 
accommodation and accountability’ (Khadiagala et al., 2010:53). Competitive electoral 
systems are crucial as ‘ideally they allow for the peaceful transfer of power and make it 
possible to assign accountability to those who govern’ (Hӧglund, 2009:414). Chapters three 
and four will present which systems are applicable in the respective countries chosen for this 
study. 
Connected to the development of political and electoral systems is the influence of socio-
economic factors. The last conceptualization will elaborate on this factor and inform on 
which aspects are covered by this factor. 
 
2.2.5 Socio-Economic Factors 
 
Socio-economic factors, when referred to in this thesis, include factors such as 
unemployment rate, economic growth, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), social welfare 
system, health statistics, poverty, and poverty rate. These are merely examples; there are 
many factors involved. The purpose for clarifying the concept of socio-economic factors lies 
in the fact that these factors will be examined as part of their being a potential contributing 
factor to electoral violence. One example could be high unemployment rates due to 
malfunctioning of the ruling authority. People’s motivation to object to re-election of the 
current ruling authority through rigged elections could be highly triggered by bad socio-
economic living conditions. This will be further examined when researching the cases of 
Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
 
2.2.6 Ethnicity 
 
Lastly, ethnicity will now be touched upon as it is a highly present factor in African society. 
An ethnic group can be perceived as a certain group of people who identify themselves with 
one another based on common heritage, culture, language, ideology and/or religion. The 
African continent counts numerous different ethnic groups and ethnicity is often a factor in 
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African politics due to minority and majority groups. When referring to ethnicity in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, the respective chapters three and four will appoint which ethnic groups are 
under discussion. The effect of ethnicity on political contestation can, amongst others, be 
found in the threat of groups mobilizing along their ethnic background during elections. 
Another example would be the effect of favouritism of the ethnic background of the ruling 
president when discriminating against other ethnicities. Lastly, as an example, the outbreak of 
violence during elections connected to ethnicity often affects the most innocent. The citizens 
who endeavour the free election process vote for the man/woman who appeals the most to 
them, and might then become the victim of violence due to his or her ethnic background, 
completely loose from any political meaning. 
Further clarification of additional concepts will be provided when and where applicable 
throughout the thesis. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The preparatory part of this chapter introduced the connection between democratic 
development and peace. Put even stronger, elections have become part of the international 
peace-building strategy.  
David C Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg wrote an article in 2000, Elections and 
Violence, Terrorism and Political Violence, in which they address the relationship between 
violence-producing and violence-reducing propensities of elections. Although they 
acknowledge that a comprehensive typology of elections is a task too heavy for their article, 
they do suggest some distinctions. ‘Three types are conspicuous: the election principle may 
be rejected; the principle may be valid but the applicant is not, as when citizens belong to 
different communities; and the most common and complex occurs when participants 
understand a particular instance to be unfair, but they do not explicitly reject the principle or 
system’ (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2000:34). The first type, rejection, can be understood as 
follows; some will never believe that competitive elections bring legitimacy. This can be seen 
in that ‘radical political parties often spend more time fighting each other on the streets than 
organizing for the polling booths’ (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2000:35). The purpose which 
competitive elections have is therewith completely put aside, as the elections are already 
negatively judged beforehand. Secondly, the principle of application rejected concerns social 
divisions. It is not so much about rejecting elections as such, the elections are accepted, it is 
more the principle of some groups having the feeling or belief that they do not belong to the 
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community. ‘Elections in such contexts express existing antagonisms without resolving them, 
and may persuade some there is no point in maintaining the system’ (Rapoport and 
Weinberg, 2000:35).  As Rapoport and Weinberg further argue, it is often the case when 
elections are fought out along ethnic or religious lines, that this imposes unacceptable 
conditions on the losers. The differences in parties in Africa are wholly ethnic and no matter 
who wins, ‘elections generally exacerbate and complicate social divisions further’ (Rapoport 
and Weinberg, 2000:36). Lastly, unfairness is addressed by Rapoport and Weinberg; they 
argue that election violence most often occurs to bend the rules. This last one is connected to 
Khadiagala’s approach. As mentioned above, Khadiagala offers a suggestive typology of 
electoral violence. ‘In the first order of causes, electoral violence is the outcome of events 
and circumstances that emanate from broader political conflicts, particularly in societies that 
are beset by ethnic, communal and sectarian fissures. In the second category, electoral 
violence is a consequence of imperfect electoral rules; imperfections that allow some parties 
to manipulate elections through electoral fraud, vote buying, and rigging’ (Khadiagala, 
2010:17). Bending the rules, as Rapoport and Weinberg state, is not easily possible unless 
imperfect electoral rules are in place. Transparency of the electoral process, checks and 
balances, regulations regarding ballots and so forth are all subjects of the electoral process 
which contribute to the possibility of fraud. Khadiagala furthermore argues that no matter 
what, elections are always competitive events with uncertain outcomes. He then refers to 
Shaheen Mozaffar and Andrew Schedler who have characterized the paradox of transparency 
and uncertainty in terms of procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty:  
  
„The close association between procedural legitimacy and sustentative uncertainty poses 
the paradoxical challenge „institutionalizing uncertainty‟… The paradox is that uncertainty 
requires procedural certainty. It is this paradox that defined the central task of electoral 
governance: organizing electoral uncertainty by providing institutional certainty. 
Distinguishing between substantive and procedural uncertainty enables a more nuanced 
understanding of variations in political actors‟ risk aversion. Authoritarian and democratic 
actors, for instance, exhibit different attitudes towards uncertainty. While the former attempt 
to reduce the uncertainty of outcomes, the latter attempt to reduce the uncertainty of 
institutional rules‟ (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002:12). 
 
Khadiagala hereafter argues that institutions are the mediators of the two seemingly 
contradictory factors, bringing predictability and order to the competitive game. Electoral 
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violence, however, profoundly alters this, injecting a new element between transparent rule 
and uncertain outcomes. ‘This is why, for the most part, electoral violence reflects the 
absence and/or the distortion of rules for orderly competition’ (Khadiagala, 2010:17). 
Khadiagala arrives at his typology by asking the question whether the African electoral 
violence is caused by profound divisions inherent in Africa’s polities and socio-economic 
systems or whether it signals the transitional teething problems.  
Another angle of typology is introduced by Fischer who presents a more detailed one on 
election violence, with emphasis the different phases of the process. He proposes a five-phase 
typology. The first is an identity conflict, which occurs during the voter registration process. 
Certain types of people, such as refugees or other conflict-forced migrants, cannot 
(re)establish their officially recognized identities. The implication of this is marginalization 
of these groups and they remain outside of the political process and therewith potentially 
provoke conflict within the process. The second is campaign conflict, which will occur when 
rivals seek to interrupt or disturb the opponent’s campaign through means such as voter 
intimidation or even through the use of violence by themselves to influence participation in 
the voting. ‘As a survey of electoral events from 2001 will suggest, conflict among political 
rivals appears to have been the most common form of electoral conflict’ (Fischer, 2002:10). 
Zimbabwe and the 2008 elections is an example of this. The third one is balloting conflict on 
election day itself. This will possibly occur when political rivalries are played out at the 
polling station. The fourth one is results conflict, which indicates dispute over election 
results, and mainly, the inability to resolve the dispute through judicial mechanisms in a fair 
and transparent manner. The fifth and last one is related to the electoral system and identified 
by Fischer as representation conflict. This can occur in cases when elections are organized as 
zero-sum events where the losing party is left out of participation in governance (Fischer, 
2002:9-11). 
Kristine Hӧglund, a profound academic in the field, classifies two strands of research 
regarding the term electoral violence. In her first approach she identifies electoral violence as 
‘a sub-set of activities in a larger political conflict’ (Hӧglund, 2009:415). Electoral violence 
occurs especially as part of the trajectory of ethnic or communal violence in divided societies 
such as Kenya. Studies have further indicated that in these cases, violence tends to cluster 
around election times. In Hӧglund’s second approach, ‘electoral violence is seen as the 
ultimate kind of electoral fraud. Electoral fraud has been defined as clandestine efforts to 
shape election results and includes activities like ballot rigging, vote buying, and disruptions 
of the registration process’ (Hӧglund, 2009:415). 
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With these classifications in mind, this thesis will focus on Khadiagala’s typology. The five 
main factors subject to analysis are free and fair elections, political/electoral system, 
international assistance, socio-economic factors and ethnicity. Khadiagala classifies two 
mainstream electoral violence fields; in short, electoral violence as a result of broader 
political conflicts and electoral violence as a result of imperfect electoral rules. In addition to 
this, however, international assistance is under investigation, together with the three phases of 
election violence, pre-election, election day and post-election. This is reviewed in a separate 
classification as international assistance has proved to improve democratic institutions, or at 
least observe a free and fair process, which could contribute to the understanding of imperfect 
electoral rules and electoral violence. The reason behind why so much emphasis is placed on 
the different phases of the electoral process is because all three phases have in the past proved 
to be prone to election violence.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
After having discussed Africa’s history and present situation regarding democracy and 
elections, it is fair to conclude that research towards the causal factors behind election-related 
violence is of major importance. Although official democracies have been established over 
the years in Africa, the question raised by scholars, among others Khadiagala, is whether or 
not Africa is heading towards, or, is in need of a fourth wave of democratization. The current 
democracies need to either consolidate and further strengthen and deepen their institutions, or 
perhaps structure a more African democracy with slightly less Western influence and slightly 
more African influence. Either way, it is clear from past election violence breaking out, that 
citizens are fed up with stolen elections. The citizens are speaking up more often when their 
leaders go beyond the established norms to achieve their objective. Furthermore, it is 
concluded that researching the causal factors behind election violence will shed light on the 
main source of the violence, whether electoral violence is a result of broader political 
conflicts or more as a result of imperfect electoral rules.  
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Chapter Three: Kenya’s 2007 Presidential Elections 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The following chapter will give an overview of the Kenyan 2007 presidential elections and 
the run up to the polls. It will provide a discussion on the five causal factors identified, in 
order to analyse the factors and compare them to Zimbabwe in Chapter Five. Moreover, 
additional background information regarding, for example, historical issues or economic 
development will be provided when necessary. It is a rather descriptive piece; it is needed 
however in order to fully comprehend the upcoming analysis. 
 
3.2 Background Facts 
 
Kenya is located in the east of Africa, with an extended coastline at its eastern side, but also 
bordering Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Its geographical location is 
situated close to the Arabian Peninsula, which during the eighth century invited Arab and 
Persian settlers whom established themselves along the coast. Later, Nilotic and Bantu 
peoples moved into the region. Bantu people now comprise two-thirds of the Kenyan 
population. The Arab domination was interrupted by the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498, 
but it was not until mid-1800 when the British explorers arrived, that a true protectorate was 
in the making. In 1895, Britain’s East Africa Protectorate was established, and in 1920, 
Kenya became an official British colony. The rule of the British settlers, some 30,000 strong, 
was direct and did not allow any African representatives in any form of governing authority. 
Additionally, land was taken away by the British settlers from ethnic groups such as the 
Kikuyu, Maasai and many more, who ended up with no land. In a few cases, the now 
landless, ethnic groups worked for the settlers, but were economically set back with no or 
little outlook on the prosperity they would have had if they had been able to continue farming 
on their land (Department of State, 2011). 
In 1921, as a reaction to their exclusion, the Kikuyu people founded Kenya’s first protest 
movement named the Young Kikuyu Association (Department of State, 2011). The 
movement was however quickly banned by the government and in 1924 the Kikuyu Central 
Association replaced it. It was not until 1944 that the British – under pressure – allowed a few 
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African representatives in the legislature. These were however appointed by the British and 
not elected.  
In 1952, the Mau Mau insurgency placed Kenya in a state of emergency. The Mau Mau 
was mainly represented by the Kikuyu people and protested largely against British colonial 
rule, and land policies in particular. This war left tens of thousands of the Kikuyu people 
dead; only a few hundred British people died. The aim of the war was however partly 
achieved and as a result, African representation in the Kenyan legislature increased rapidly. 
In 1957, the first direct elections for Africans to the Legislative Council were held. 
Consequently, independence followed on 12 December 1963. 
In 1963, Jomo Kenyatta, the head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), became 
Kenya’s first president. At that time there was still a minority party, Kenya African 
Democratic Party, which represented small ethnic groups; however, it dissolved itself in 1964 
and joined KANU, leaving Kenya with a single-party state. Nonetheless, another attempt 
towards creating a multi-party state came from Jaramogi Oginga Odinga by erecting an 
opposition party called the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). Shortly after its establishment, 
however, this party was banned, leaving KANU as Kenya’s sole political party.  The reason 
for the ban was that KPU leader Oginga Odinga was detained following an incident when 18 
people died in Kisumu, where angry people threatened the life of Kenyatta. The consequence 
of the subsequent ban of the KPU was the creation of a single-party state and that KANU 
amended the constitution in a way that put the party ‘above the law’ (Rutten and Owuor, 
2008:313). Already at this point, by this constitutional amendment, a real political democracy 
could not be established and Kenya’s electoral contestation was hindered. From these facts it 
appears as if Kenya has a long and difficult history with electoral contestation and troubled 
elections is therefore not an entirely new phenomenon. 
In 1978, President Kenyatta died and Daniel arap Moi became interim president. After 
being elected head of KANU, Moi became president in October 1978. During his single-party 
era which lasted up to 1992, President Moi targeted Kikuyu capital, closed Kikuyu-owned 
banks and built his Kalenjin power base (Rutten and Owuor, 2008:313). The ethnic 
background to election conflict will be further highlighted below, it is however crucial to note 
that ethnic conflict related to politics thus goes back decades in the Kenyan political history.  
In 1982, protests against the political system broke out, and an unsuccessful attempt was 
made to overthrow the government. Shortly after, President Moi annulled the constitutional 
change and in 1992, Kenya’s first multiparty elections were held. Moi remained president 
following the 1992 and 1997 elections, mainly due to divided opposition parties. However, 
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following the 1997 elections the first coalition government by KANU was formed as it only 
gained a majority if working together with a few minority parties. 
Even though the ethnically divided opposition did not succeed in removing KANU from 
power in elections in 1992 and 1997 – which were marred by violence and fraud – these 
elections were viewed as having generally reflected the will of the Kenyan people (CIA, 
2011). President Moi stepped down in December 2002 following the elections. The level of 
fraud in the 2002 elections was still present and not up to democratic standards, but saw 
major improvements with regard to their administration and competitiveness was observed 
(European Union, 2008). 
In 2002, Kenya would experience the election of its third president. A coalition of 
opposition parties formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and in December 2002 
the NARC candidate, Mwai Kibaki, was elected president. President Kibaki comes from a 
Kikuyu background and has served as a Member of Parliament since 1963. President Kibaki 
is still in office today. 
The 2007 elections marked the tenth general elections since 1963, and the fourth general 
elections since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991. Further comments on the 
quantity versus the quality of the elections in Kenya will follow. 
 
Table 1: Ethnic Groups in Kenya 
Share of ethnic group in Kenya  % 
Kikuyu  23 
Luhya  14 
Luo  13 
Kalenjin  11 
Kamba  11 
Sub-total  72 
Kisii  6 
Meru  5 
Mijikenda  4.8 
Sub-total of three groups  16 
Remaining other groups  11 
Total  100 
In order to appreciate the role of ethnic politics, it is 
important to understand the ethnic make-up of Kenya’s 
population. A total of five ethnic groups make up over 
70 percent of the population, but no single group 
comprises more than one quarter of all Kenyans. 
Source: www.undp.org 
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3.3 Free and Fair Elections  
 
This section will examine the factor of free and fair elections and its possible contribution to 
the election violence. First of all, it is emphasized that already three months prior to the 
elections, political violence occurred in Kenya, causing the loss of some 600 lives (Kagwanja 
and Southall, 2008:262).  
Kenya invited several international observers – which will be elaborated on further on in 
this chapter – who concluded in their final report that the certification of presidential 
candidates took place on 14 and 15 November 2007 without any troubles. The nomination 
process for the parliamentary and civic elections were, however, ‘seriously marred by 
irregularities, chaotic administration, interference by party headquarters in individual 
constituencies and violence in protest against the process and outcome by voters and 
unsuccessful aspirants and their supporters’ (European Union, 2008). With regards to the 
campaigning period prior to the elections, these were conducted in a fairly open and free 
environment. Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) observers concluded that ‘the 
campaigning atmosphere was also characterized by a strong ethno-political polarization 
between the two main contenders in the presidential election and their alliances, leading to a 
generally tense atmosphere in their respective regional stronghold towards the other side’ 
(European Union, 2008). These pre-election tensions are an important factor to keep in mind 
when it comes to the build-up to election violence. As the atmosphere surrounding the 
upcoming election day was already marked by ethno-polarization, it is even more crucial to 
consider if any outcome at all would have been accepted. 
With regards to the free and fairness of the campaigning period, the Kenyan Commission 
for Human Rights (KNHCR) reported that the distribution of money and gifts was widely 
reported, which is against democratic principles. Furthermore, widespread abuse of state 
resources was also reported by the KNHCR. On a positive note, freedom of speech in the 
media was generally respected; regretfully on the other hand, on the announcement of the 
results for the presidential elections, neither journalists nor diplomats were allowed into the 
Kenyatta International Conference Centre (European Union, 2008). No real reason for the 
exclusion of diplomats and journalists has been given by the Kenyan government; however, it 
is clear that the government could keep full control when announcing the results without 
international journalists critically assessing the validity of the process. 
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The announcement that President Kibaki had won the fiercely contested elections came after 
a rather dubious and messy counting and tallying process, with delays and extensive 
perceptions of vote rigging.  
The Kenya Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF) elaborated on the electoral process, 
the counting of votes, the situation at polling stations and so forth, in a preliminary press 
statement and verdict of the 2007 Kenyan general elections.  
In October 2007, KEDOF trained and appointed 13 Regional Coordinators covering all 
regions of the country. Later in the year they additionally trained and deployed 454 
constituency observers to cover the 210 constituencies. 
On election day the situation at most polling stations was reported calm, patient and 
peaceful. The counting of the votes was however dubious, including the, by law enforced, 
accompanying documents. First of all, Kenyan law prescribes that counting of the votes is to 
be done at the polling stations and that these results are recorded on statutory forms which are 
to be put up noticeably at the polling stations for all to see. This process further contains the 
signing of the statutory forms by both the Presiding Officers as the Party Agents. One of the 
signs of fraud was in these statutory forms because in many polling stations these forms, 
being 16A and 17A, were not countersigned by all Party Agents. Second of all, in some 
constituencies the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was unable to reach the Returning 
Officers (RO) (KEDOF, Press Statement, 2007). This was the case even though measures 
were taken by means of satellite telephones for remote areas and adequate airtime was 
provided for the cell phones. Third of all, Kenyan law prescribes for presidential elections 
that physical copies of the statutory declarations must be delivered by the Returning Officers. 
Even though returns from most constituencies were done within reasonable time, a delay 
from certain regions raises questions. Fourthly, questions were raised when results which 
were submitted irregularly, for example, photocopies of the statutory declaration, were still 
accepted. These photocopied declarations are highly vulnerable to fraud (KEDOF, Press 
Statement, 2007). 
Concluding remarks by the ECK did admit to the possibility of fraud due to the above-
mentioned factors, or at least that ‘it raised questions’. However, the overall concluding 
paragraph states, ‘In our view, considering the entire electoral process, the 2007 General 
Elections were credible as far as the voting and counting process is concerned. The electoral 
process lost credibility towards the end with regards to the tallying and announcement of 
presidential results’ (KEDOF, Press Statement, 2007). In other words, the parliamentary 
elections more or less raised the overall legitimacy of the elections and the judgment of the 
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quality of the democratic process. The presidential election and its process has been credited 
little legitimacy. 
The European Commission and its observers marked the following; ‘Serious 
inconsistencies and anomalies were identified in the results announced by the ECK. For 
example, in Molo and Kieni, there were significant differences between presidential election 
results reported by EU EOM observers at the constituency level and results announced by the 
ECK at national level’ (2008). Furthermore, they concluded that the ‘2007 General Elections 
have fallen short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections. Most 
significantly, they were marred by a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of 
presidential results, which raises concerns about the accuracy of the final result of this 
election’ (2008). 
Within minutes of the announcement of the results in which President Kibaki was re-
elected, violence broke out. An important observation to be made regards the three different 
phases of the election process. In Kenya it is clear that in the run up to the election, people 
already experienced irregularities. The fact that the nomination process showed severe flaws, 
the wrongful distribution of money and gifts, and the usage of state resources are all pointers 
to the possibility of a rigged process and ultimately the outbreak of election violence. The 
fact that violence broke out immediately after the announcement of the results indicates the 
already established high level of tensions. Almost as if people were merely waiting to get the 
‘go ahead’ when announcement was made.  Further analysis will follow in Chapter Five after 
having presented all the sufficient facts, data and the other factors possibly involved.  
 
3.4 Political and Electoral System  
 
The 2007 general elections in Kenya consisted of elections for the president, 210 members of 
the National Assembly and 2,498 members of local authority. The elections are based on a 
simple majority, first-past–the-post system. The outcome of presidential elections is however 
determined, next to simple majority, by a 25 percent of the vote in at least five of Kenya’s 
eight provinces. Presidents are elected for a five-year term, with eligibility for a second term 
of five years. In the above mentioned certification of presidential candidates which took 
place in November 2007, nine candidates of nine different parties were approved to run in the 
2007 elections.  
Kenya’s democracy and/or political spheres are profoundly bound to several prominent 
international treaties. Elections in Kenya are governed by a patchwork of legislation that 
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includes the Constitution of Kenya, eight Acts of Parliament and seven pieces of subsidiary 
legislation. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, just to mention a few. Additionally, as a 
member of the African Union, Kenya has agreed and endorsed the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa encompassed in a 2002 Declaration and welcomed and signed 
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in 2007 (Khadiagala, 2010). 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance ‘seeks to entrench in the 
continent a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and 
transparent election conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral 
bodies (Khadiagala, 2010:169). Although Kenya signed the Charter, as of February 2011, it is 
still not ratified. It seems as if this act could be seen as part of the aforementioned façade 
democracy. To put it bluntly, on paper Kenya has all the formalities and right reasons to act 
as a fully established democracy in case of elections, in practice, however, flaws appear at 
every stage of the election process.  
When looking at Kenya’s legal framework, however, some shortcomings and deficiencies 
are noted. Although the framework provides for a workable one, the exclusion of, for 
example, the system on how to resolve electoral disputes does not provide for a prompt and 
adequate response as complaints can only be handed in 28 days after the announcement of 
results. With a system containing more accurate regulations on complaints, the outbreak of 
such heavy violence as it did could perhaps have been avoided. Furthermore, the duration of 
the campaign period and the maximum registered number of voters per polling stations are 
not regulated, leaving much room for interpretation (European Union, 2008).  
On the account of voter registration, Kenya performed reasonably, experiencing some 
obstacles, in particular with regards to double or multiple registrations of votes. The total 
number of voters in the 2007 elections was 14,296,180. In Kenya, under the Constitution 
anyone above the age of 18 and who has been residing in Kenya for a certain time period can 
register as a voter (Kriegler and Waki, 2009:18). Obstacles were experienced with the 
extremely low productivity of the system; the average number of voters registered per 
registration centre was about one per day during the 2007 registration period (Kriegler and 
Waki, 2009:18). The issuing of identity cards in particular was experienced as a severely 
slow and time consuming process. The limited resources and extremely bureaucratic 
organization of the Registrar of Persons led to delays. Moreover, in the report written by the 
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European Union, Muslim, Hindu and Maasai experienced exceptional difficulties in obtaining 
identity cards. This caused delays for members of these groups to register and was therewith 
hindered tremendously in their participation. 
After the 2002 elections many recommendations were given by numerous experts, it 
seems however as if Kenya has not implemented these to the full extent. Even though the 
political/electoral system has a certain degree of coverage in law and the Constitution, too 
much space was still inherently present for ‘human error’. The lack of clear cut rules, a 
proper voter registration system and, maybe most importantly, the adherence to the 
agreements set out in Kenya’s signed treaties, leave room for reasons of conflict. 
 
3.5 International Assistance  
 
International assistance is one aspect which has the possibility of reducing the chances of 
rigging an electoral process. Also, it can assist in the formulation of rules, regulations, 
protocols and other aspects which could make the process as smooth as possible. 
International assistance is almost always provided on request. Whenever a government 
invites delegates from, for example, the United Nations, it is a sign of good intentions. In 
many cases governments do not allow any form of international assistance, even in the form 
of journalists. 
In Kenya, the government was fairly open to it and requested the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) to assist in the 2007 elections. The UNDP Kenya set up a 
program to strengthen the overall capacity of the Electoral Commission of Kenya and was 
supported by many donors such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The 
two main goals were to achieve an independent assessment of the elections as free and fair 
and an increase in voter turn-out (UNDP, Media and Elections, 2008). 
The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was also invited by the 
Kenyan government. They were present from the 14 November onwards. At first sight, this is 
a positive sign; however, in the evaluation report the EU EOM states, ‘EOM observers were 
generally welcomed by voters, party agents and election officials at the polling stations. At 
the tallying centres, however, they encountered problems of access and information, 
particularly in Central Province. Transparency was not always maintained at a national level 
either. At ECK headquarters, the EU EOM electoral expert was forbidden entry into the 
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tallying room on various occasions, despite clear and public instructions from the ECK 
chairman that he be granted access’ (European Union, 2008). 
It is thus no guarantee that by inviting international observers, that the process is 
conducted free and fair. One could see it as a soothing of the population beforehand to 
prevent doubts. After the elections, however, which remains the most vital part, when 
announcing the results, no foreigners in any form – no journalists, diplomats or other 
‘outsiders’ – were allowed to be present.  
An analysis and comparison will follow in Chapter Five after having reviewed the case of 
Zimbabwe as well. 
 
3.6 Socio-Economic Factors  
 
This section will briefly touch upon the socio-economic factors and circumstances in Kenya. 
It is a rather factual piece; however, the presented data will provide crucial background 
information for the next section and for Chapter Five. It will mainly focus on economic 
development as the social aspects are in this case quite connected to ethnicity and the colonial 
background thereof, which is further discussed in the next section. 
To start off with, some basic facts: Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is 
$1,600; its unemployment rate is fluctuating around 40 percent with a labor force of about 
17.9 million out of a total population of 41,070,934 (CIA, 2011); 85 percent of its people are 
literate and 7percent of GDP is spent on educational purposes; 50 percent of the population 
lives below the poverty line; furthermore, 75 percent of Kenya’s labor force works in the 
agricultural sector and 25 percent in industry and services (CIA, 2011). These statistics 
demonstrate little positive economic circumstances for the people living in Kenya. Corruption 
has played a major role in the slow-moving development of the economy. Additionally, the 
1998 United States Embassy bombings in Nairobi and the financial crisis in 2007 had 
negative effects on the Kenyan economy, not to mention the election violence in early 2008. 
Kenya has known great economic development though. When NARC came to power in 
2003 many of the promises made were kept. In Kibaki’s first term a stunning success in 
economic recovery was witnessed with the creation of 500,000 jobs per year, improved 
public services, and appropriate attempts at ending corruption by erecting the proper legal 
and institutional framework to combat it. As a result, the economic recovery as growth rose 
from a yearly 3.4 percent in 2003 to a yearly 7 percent in 2007 (Kagwanja and Southall, 
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2009:264). Furthermore, this government delivered on the promised free primary education 
for all children, it reduced deficit spending and attracted foreign investment. 
However, these remarkable positive developments were overshadowed by equally 
negative political scandals in the form of corrupt activities. Although the government had 
erected the legal and institutional framework to combat corruption, its record of actually 
prosecuting and convicting persons involved in corruption was miserable. Furthermore, the 
top leaders of the government and opposition who were involved in the Goldenberg scandal 
remained untouched and went free. The Goldenberg scandal involved US$800 million rip off 
from the Moi era involving government rebates for fake diamonds. Additionally, the 
government created a huge scandal of its own; the Anglo leasing scandal. This involved 
officers who were engaged in security contracts with official payoffs (Kagwanja and 
Southall, 2009:264). These two are merely examples to indicate the level and significance of 
corruption in Kenya; unfortunately, there are many more examples which can be given. 
Meanwhile, the election in 2007 took place against a backdrop of dramatic population 
growth which deepened poverty, widened inequality and because of the demographic changes 
youth underemployment was more and more becoming a reality. In fact, at independence in 
1963, Kenya’s population was 8.5 million; in 2008 this was 38 million. In addition to this, 
Kenya’s landscape is for over 80 percent parched land, meaning that over 75 percent of the 
population is concentrated in the high potential agricultural belt north west of the capital, 
Nairobi, up to the Ugandan border. As indicated above, 75 percent of the Kenyan workforce 
is involved in agricultural business, meaning a scarcity of land with such an exploding 
population resulting in competition amongst the 42 different ethnic groups became an extra 
concern. Increasing stress was thus experienced due to these demographics and 
underemployment issues in the run up to the 2007 elections. ‘Confronted with acute poverty, 
inequalities and unemployment in the context of ethnic polarization and the resurgence of 
ethno-nationalism, Kenya’s fragmented power elite resorted to populism and manipulation of 
genuine economic grievances and disaffection to win the vote of the poor’ (Kagwanja and 
Southall, 2009:265). 
President Kibaki’s party, backed by the Kikuyu, trusted that the delivered economic 
performance in his first years – even though the economic growth had stopped and Kenya’s 
economy and people were suffering – would be enough reason and motivation for the people 
to let him stay in power and therefore used the slogan ‘Kibaki Aendele’, meaning Let Kibaki 
Continue. Odinga’s party, however, campaigned with the desire for change and emphasized 
change for everyone, and not just one ethnic group. This is where the slogan ‘forty-one-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
against-one’ comes from. It was as if the Kibaki government and the Kikuyu appeared as one, 
against the remaining 41 other ethnic groups. In a speech in September 2007 Odinga stated 
that his party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), seeks to end Kenya’s ‘economic 
apartheid’ under which one black group, the Kikuyu, had all the privileges (Kagwanja and 
Southall, 2009:265). This formed the basis of ethnic populism. 
The following section will further discuss the factor of ethnicity in the Kenyan election 
violence. 
 
3.7 Ethnicity 
 
Solomon Dersso states in his The 2007 Post-election Crisis in Kenya as a Crisis of State 
Institutions that the vote rigging was merely a triggering factor in the outbreak of the 
violence. He concludes that other factors played a more vital role. ‘The most important ones 
include the legacy of colonial rule, unequal patterns of control of political power and 
distribution of resources among members of different communities as well as the question of 
ownership and land’ (Dersso, 2008:21). 
The electoral violence in 2007-2008 was certainly not the first clash in the history of 
Kenya and it is therefore argued that the violent conflict was the result of deep-rooted 
historical ethnic tensions. In 1992 the Maasai heavily clashed with Kikuyu immigrants and in 
1997 in Likoni in the Mombasa district Coastal youths attacked non-indigenous residents, 
leaving approximately 100 dead and 100,000 misplaced (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009:269).  
This chapter will further examine the colonial period, with an emphasis on conflict over 
land, ethnicity and politics. The European settlers who arrived in Kenya had as their foremost 
goal to cultivate the fertile highlands and/or to keep livestock in the Rift Valley. This was 
naturally bound to clash with the people who already established a living and who were 
engaged in farming in these areas. The Kikuyu especially occupied the area north of Nairobi, 
which had the most value for the settlers due to its fertility. ‘Between 1903 and 1906 
approximately 60,000 acres of Kikuyu territory in the Kiambu-Lumuru district were alienated 
to settlers’ (Sorrenson, 1968:180). Maasai also suffered huge land losses, together with the 
Tugen (a small subgroup of the Kalenijn), and numerous other minor ethnic groups. Even 
though protests were made by the ethnic groups, they lost in court due to technicalities and 
since then the present process and trouble around land loss started.  
The newly established European farms took their chance of hiring the former landowners 
as a means of cheap labour. Estimates are that in 1930 some 100,000 Kikuyu lived outside on 
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European farms, while some 500,000 stayed inside the Kikuyu Reserve. It was only in 1960 
that the government finally ended the original reservation of the ‘White Highlands’ for 
farming by Europeans only. 
At the same time, the relation between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin/Maasai became more and 
more troubled. The Kikuyu started the ‘Land Freedom Army’ and received massive support. 
In 1961 Oginga Odinga addressed a large crowd where they vowed ‘never to buy land in the 
white highlands that was rightfully theirs’ (Rutten and Owuor, 2008:310). Kenyatta, on the 
other hand, stated that land should be purchased so that property rights would be respected. 
This statement, however, found little support from the Africans, as, for example, in the 1990s 
two European farms came up for sale in the areas claimed by the Nandi, they wanted these 
farms for nothing. Also, in 2004 the Maasai demanded the return of the ranches in Laikipia 
which were still owned by well-off foreigners and Kenyans. The land-related struggle started 
to grow and become more intense.   
Ethnic divisions were thus already present at that time surrounding land issues. Tribal 
interests were based upon land and therewith their economic interest. The land question was 
the fundamental division. Political activity started to rise surrounding the land issue, and 
groups and parties were formed in order to stand up for their land, which every group claimed 
as rightfully theirs. KANU, which was mainly a Kikuyu-Luo body, saw the rising of the 
Maasai United Front (MUF), who together with several other small groups such as the 
Kalenjin Political Associastion, the Somali National Association, and the Luhya-based 
Kenyan African Peoples Party, linked up with KADU. 
In the meanwhile, independence was around the corner and the land issue was probably 
the single most explosive issue on the independence agenda. ‘The area of most controversy 
was the Rift Valley…the communities that felt the most threatened by the possible influx of 
landless Kikuyu peasants into the Rift Valley under a KANU government tended to support 
the federalist policies of KADU’ (Muigai, 1995:166-167). Many land claims followed, by 
many different ethnic groups. Almost none were adhered to. The last year before 
independence saw many groups settling illegally in the Nakuru area as less than 10 percent of 
the applications for land were awarded (Rutten and Owuor, 2008:312). 
The post-colonial period can be best divided into four eras; The Kenyatta era from 1963-
1978, the Moi single party era from 1978-1992, the Moi multi-party era from 1992-2002 and 
the Kibaki era from 2002 until present. Interesting to note regarding these four eras is that 
first of all, as mentioned, the single-party system era was manipulatively established. Second 
of all, the switch back to the multi-party system era occurred under severe pressure from 
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violent protests. This could be interpreted as yet another façade created by the elite to secure 
legitimacy for their continued rule. Consequently, a halt, or at least a delay, in the 
development of the Kenyan democratic system. 
Starting with Kenyatta, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the government bought land back 
from the white farmers using money from the British government and this land was 
subdivided for occupation by landless, unemployed and progressive farmers. However, the 
majority of land was distributed to the hands of the wealthy. Ogot states that ‘over half of the 
settler lands were transferred almost intact by sale to wealthy Africans…a new land policy 
based on class, instead of race, was being established in Kenya’ (1996:64). Rutten and Owuor 
quote an anonymous person in 1982 saying: 
 
„It would be a misreading of the situation to see the deep divisions among our people as a 
„natural‟ outcome of endemic „tribalism‟. Instead, our power-hungry leaders stirred up and 
used tribal sentiment when they found it convenient to do so. Their aim was to divert 
attention from the real dynamics at work in the country – the emergence of a rapacious 
bunch of mercenaries whose own class interest transcended ethnic bounds‟. 
(Rutten and Owuor, 2008:313) 
 
Throughout the 1970s, or rather throughout Kenyatta’s era, the transfer of farmland, the 
grabbing of both urban and rural public land by influential individuals continued. 
The Moi single-party era unfortunately did not provide for much change, except for the 
fact that now the Kalenjin was favoured instead of the Kikuyu. It became Kalenjin ethnic 
nationalism instead of Kenyatta’s Kikuyu nationalism. More and more clashes and violence 
were reported, again surrounding the land issue. In October 1993, a group of over 500 people 
attacked the village of Enoosupukia in Northern Narok, occupied by Kikuyu immigrants who 
had bought the land after 1960. The attackers, dressed as Maasai, killed about 20 people, 
burned houses and shops, and as a result thereof, some 30,000 people fled the area. This is 
merely an example, as many more ethnically based conflicts arose. 
The 1997 election also saw violence. The ethnic and land based violence can clearly be 
made out from the following statement made by the Human Rights Watch: 
 
„The perpetrators of the coast attacks were largely disgruntled local young men whose 
hostility toward non-indigenous residents of the region led them to support a divisive ethnic 
agenda that also served the ruling party‟s political aspirations. Their goal was to drive away 
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members of the ethnic groups originating from inland Kenya – the „up-country‟ population – 
in order to gain access to jobs, land and educational opportunities…The raiders‟ own 
principal aim was to regain their ancestral land, while ruling party politicians supported 
them with a view of retaining and winning electoral seats‟ (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
 
Between 1991 and 1998 it was investigated that some 6,000 people died as a result of 
politically motivated ethnic clashes. No investigation, prosecution or conviction was initiated 
after the publication of these findings. 
Uhuru Kenyatta was nominated as KANU’s presidential candidate, which caused a split; a 
large group defected to the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and the 40-year 
reign of the KANU had come to an end. Kibaki was celebrated as Kenya’s new president. 
Kenyans were optimistic and hopeful for free education, more jobs, less corruption and so 
forth. The post 2002 election period was consequently dominantly peaceful. 
The one goal of the 2002 united opposition was to remove President Moi. Odinga’s 
declaration of Kibaki Tosha, meaning Kibaki is fit to be president, paved the way for his 
presidency and even for a short while convinced Kenyans that they could be united regardless 
of ethnicity or background. Unfortunately, however, the split in the opposition team came 
during the referendum on a new constitution in 2005. Odinga referred to it as a Kikuyu 
constitution and led the ‘no’ campaign; whereas Kibaki led the ‘yes’ team. Odinga’s team 
won the referendum but was sacked by Kibaki soon thereafter, which more or less meant the 
birth of the Orange Democratic Party (ODP) and the Party of National Unity (PNU), the two 
major parties in the 2007 election. Another division was additionally made by the anti-
Kikuyu groups pronouncing the slogan of ‘the Presidency Kikuyu versus all others’ 
throughout the whole country; as mentioned above, the forty-one-against-one.  
This split was therewith immediately hand-in-hand with an ethnic split. Although a slight 
nuance is in place. The PNU is dominated not only by Kikuyu but also Embu and Meru, 
originating from the central and eastern provinces. ODM is dominated by the Luo, Luhya and 
Kalenjin originating from Nyanza, western province, but also groups from the coast in the 
north eastern province.  
Table 2 below indicates accurately that the thoughts on the elections are strongly affected 
by the ethnic background. The Kikuyu, clearly, found the elections to be honest; the Luo not 
at all. These major differences cannot be judged as a coincidence but purely represent the 
harsh ethnic troubled reality Kenya’s politics is dealing with. 
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    Table 2: Poll: Do you believe the election was honest? 
 
(Source: Rheault and Totora, 2008) 
 
Having discussed the ethnical background, the information will be further used and applied in 
Chapter Five when the comparative analysis to Zimbabwe is presented.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The former British colony of Kenya has been independent since 1963. Since then it has 
known three presidents, currently with President Kibaki as head of state. 
The 2007 presidential elections were manipulated and rigged. Although the campaigning 
period was fairly free and fair, the period was characterized by ethno-political polarization. 
The Kenyan government was relatively open for international assistance and observers and 
invited several nations and institutions. It also employed a domestic observation commission, 
KEDOF. The observing parties, however, ran into some difficulties of not gaining access to 
certain important parts of the election and no external group was invited or welcome at the 
announcement of the results. KEDOF reported dubious circumstances regarding the counting 
of votes and concludes that the overall electoral process was credible up until the counting of 
votes. The EU was a bit tougher in its conclusion:  ‘the 2007 General Elections have fallen 
short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections. Most significantly, 
they were marred by a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of presidential 
results, which raises concerns about the accuracy of the final result of this election’ (2008). 
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Although Kenya has subjected parts of its political and electoral behaviour and regulations to 
a number of (international) treaties, the actual institutional implementation and integration 
has shown to be lacking somewhat. Kenya’s electoral contestation has not been smooth and is 
not fully completed. There is still much room for fraud and little is set up for the prevention 
of conflict surrounding the elections, let alone the resolution of conflict. The deepening and 
widening of Kenya’s democracy is still a process to be attended to in order to further 
consolidate its democracy. 
With reference to Kenya’s socio-economic conditions, corruption tends to be the vital 
crunch in the country. Although President Kibaki in his first term accomplished economic 
recovery, free primary education and created 500,000 jobs, corruption downgraded this to a 
high extent. The Goldenberg scandal and the Anglo leasing scandal are merely two examples 
of how corrupt Kenya’s elite really are. No one was prosecuted, nor convicted. Economic 
stability often goes hand-in-hand with political stability and vice-versa. Economic growth 
often realises in stable societies, without political stability there is little chance for major 
improvement in the welfare of the Kenyan people. Related to this is the last factor discussed, 
although perhaps the most vital one, that of ethnicity. 
Ethnicity has proven to play a major role in the electoral violence surrounding the 2007 
elections. More accurately, it is the historical developments with regards to economic 
prosperity and ethnic groups. Favouritism has been a well-known phenomenon in Kenya, and 
Kenya’s 42 different ethnic groups have not had equal opportunities. The roots are found in 
the colonial era, and it is therefore a deep-rooted complex political conflict.  
The weight of the factors will be analysed further in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Four: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Presidential Elections 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter with Kenya, this chapter will provide an overview of the 
Zimbabwean 2008 elections, the run up to the polls and the months following them. It will 
elaborate on the five factors under discussion as well as additional information when and 
where applicable. First the section on background facts will be presented, second free and fair 
elections, third political-electoral system, international assistance, fifth socio-economic 
factors, and lastly, the factor of ethnicity. 
 
4.2 Background Facts 
 
Zimbabwe is located in the south of Sub-Sahara Africa and borders Mozambique, Zambia, 
Botswana and South Africa. Two major Bantu groups reside in Zimbabwe, these being the 
Mashona who represent about 75 percent of the population, and the Matabele who make up 
20 percent of the population. Additionally, Zimbabwe has about one per cent white 
inhabitants and about one per cent mixed and Asian (CIA, 2011). 
As with Kenya, the Portuguese arrived in the 16
th
 century, but the land remained mostly 
untouched until around 300 years later when explorers, missionaries and traders arrived. The 
British Cecil Rhodes was one of the settlers who arrived towards the end of the 19
th
 century 
and has played an important role in the history of Zimbabwe. Prior to the name Zimbabwe, 
the country was even named Rhodesia after him, under the British South Africa Company’s 
administration.  In 1888 Cecil Rhodes gained a concession for mineral rights from local 
chiefs and later that year Southern and Northern Rhodesia – the two areas which now mostly 
form Zimbabwe – were proclaimed a British sphere of influence. In 1890 the capital, Harare, 
(then called Salisbury) was established (State Department, 2011).  
In 1923, Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers were given the choice of being incorporated 
in the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. They 
chose the British Empire and Southern Rhodesia was therewith annexed later that year by the 
United Kingdom. Consequently, the European settlers started to more and concentrate more 
on developing Rhodesia’s rich mineral resources, as well as the major agricultural potential 
of the country. Clearly this led to a phenomenon all too well familiar in Africa, the settlers 
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demanded more land, and in 1934, this led to the passage of the first of a series of land 
apportionment that reserved certain areas of land of the Europeans.  
 
In 1953, in an effort to pool resources and markets, Southern Rhodesia joined Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland under the Central African Federation. Economically this was highly 
beneficial and the country flourished at this level; however, the African population objected 
to this. They feared that it would become impossible to achieve self-government with the 
federal structure dominated by the white southern Rhodesians. Again in the case of 
Zimbabwe, Africans were not participating in the political arena, as this was solely done by 
the British. The severity of the protests against the federation led to the annulment thereof in 
1963 and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent states of Zambia and 
Malawi (Department of State, 2011). The European electorate in Rhodesia, however, showed 
little interest in adhering to the demands of more African political participation. Ian Smith 
became prime minister, replacing Winston Field in 1964.  
Prime Minister Ian Smith aimed for independence and the United Kingdom was willing to 
grant it, but not before the authorities at Salisbury had showed their intention to move toward 
majority rule. Prime Minister Smith had little intentions to do so and after lengthy 
negotiations with the British government without any success, he issued a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. The British Government did 
not recognize this, nor did the United Nations. The British government went even further 
when it imposed sanctions on Rhodesia and called upon United Nations member states to do 
the same. In 1966, the United Nations followed and, for the first time, imposed mandatory 
economic sanctions on Rhodesia. This meant that Rhodesia’s primary exports were placed on 
the selective sanctions list as well as several primary goods which were imported to 
Rhodesia. Throughout the 1970s, extensive negotiations took place between Smith’s 
government and the British authorities. The Rhodesian economy started to break down due to 
the sanctions, and people became more and more disgruntled and started uprisings against the 
regime led by Prime Minister Smith. In 1976, as a result of a combination of the embargo-
related economic hardships, the pressure of heavy guerrilla activity, independence and 
majority rule in the neighbouring former Portuguese territories, and a United Kingdom–
United States diplomatic initiative, the Smith government agreed, in principle, to majority 
rule. Additionally, the Smith government agreed to a meeting in Geneva with black 
nationalist leaders to negotiate a final settlement for the conflict. Unfortunately this meeting 
failed, mainly due to Smith’s unwillingness. Another attempt was made in September 1977 
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when a detailed Anglo-American plan was put forward with proposals for majority rule, 
neutrally administered with pre-independence elections, a democratic constitution and the 
formation of an integrated army. This settlement was signed in March 1978 and the end of 
the independence war, which had cost about 20,000 lives since 1972, seemed to be in sight 
(Crisis Group, 2011).  
However, it would still take extensive time before independence was reached. Only two 
years later did Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government, after three months of severe 
bargaining, meeting and talks, grant independence on 18 April 1980, with Robert Mugabe as 
prime minister of the now-named Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe African National Union’s 
(ZANU) Robert Mugabe came to power through elections with a majority of 57 out of 80 
seats. It has to be mentioned though that Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) played a 
major role during the struggle for independence. Unfortunately, under violent pressure, this 
party dissolved; this will be further highlighted below. The Rhodesian Front (RF), consisting 
mainly of whites, won all the 20 seats reserved for whites. When Robert Mugabe came into 
power he was the most famous African president, and expectations for reform were high. In 
his speech he gave at Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980 was magnanimous. Calling for 
reconciliation and rejecting revenge, he said: ‘The wrong of the past must now stand forgiven 
and forgotten. If we ever look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, 
namely that oppression and racism are inequalities that must never find scope in our political 
and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppresses 
us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have 
power’ (Dowden, 2009:135). 
Since Robert Mugabe came to power he has not left office. He became president in 1987 
and is the only ruler that Zimbabwe has known since independence. Further discussion will 
follow in section 4.3. In this section a brief overview of the recent political and economic 
history of Zimbabwe will be presented in which the political and electoral system is 
incorporated. 
  
4.3 Free and Fair Elections  
 
Widespread consent exists around the fact that the 2008 presidential elections in Zimbabwe 
were rigged and not free and fair. The Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy 
in Africa, although not invited by the Zimbabwean government and therewith with limits, 
observed the elections. In its report, EISA Election Observer Mission Report Zimbabwe, the 
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organization concludes that the immediate run up to the elections, in other words, the 
campaigning period, was relatively free and fair. The campaign period was ‘generally 
characterized by freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and 
freedom of speech which could generally be exercised without undue hindrance’ (EISA, 
2008:52). Voters were, for example, for the first time in a decade, allowed to wear t-shirts 
displaying their political party preference. However, there were incidents of violence and 
intimidation in the run op to the election and two vital remarks are in place. Firstly, the level 
of tolerance was very low. Several stakeholders have pointed out that Zimbabwe African 
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) agents forced community members to close 
their shops and markets to compulsory attend rallies. Furthermore, the so-called Chipangano, 
meaning young ZANU-PF activists gangs, have been reported to attack opposition 
supporters. Secondly, although the immediate period to the run up is considered fairly free 
and fair, in 2007 many incidents occurred. Headlines such as ‘Mugabe’s opponents forced to 
eat election posters’ in the Guardian, and ‘Tsvangirai: vote Mugabe to stay alive’ were seen 
in Zimbabwe. As well as after the elections as the Daily Mail reports ‘Mugabe sends out 
heavy mob to intimidate voters as party announces runoff election’. The South African 
political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), although also uninvited to observe, reported in 
its post-election report that evidence was brought to the DA that opposition meetings and 
rallies were cancelled last minute by the police. The DA further reported that it was given 
extensive documentary proof of torture and physical abuse of opposition members and 
supporters (DA, 2008: 4). 
At the rather open campaigning environment just before the elections international 
observers had entered the country, so the ‘relative free and fair’ environment can be viewed 
as a manipulative maneuver by President Mugabe. Also because another form of obvious 
intentions to rig the elections arose, with Mugabe making statements such as ‘there will never 
be regime change here…never’ and ‘The MDC will never be allowed to rule this country… 
Only God who appointed me, will remove me’ (EISA, 2008:53). The freeness and fairness of 
the immediate run up to the elections is thus a dubious one with many indications towards a 
forthcoming rigged electoral process. 
The use of state resources to win votes is considered against free and fair democratic 
regulations. In Zimbabwe, it is reported that President Mugabe excessively used state 
resources and used the media to cover this. There was virtually unrestrained use of public 
media for ZANU-PF and its election campaign. ‘The president of Zimbabwe and contender in 
the presidential race made multiple donations such as buses, motor vehicles, generators, 
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television sets, food aid and agricultural equipment to communities and organisations across 
the country. The programme was funded by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’ (EISA, 
2008:65). The DA further reported in its post-election report, ‘Any environment for a free 
and fair election must be accompanied by equitable access to the media for all parties and 
individuals contesting the polls. From the onset of the campaign there was gross media bias 
in favour of the ruling party. The Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe (MMPZ) reported 
that in the first week of campaigning ZBC, Zimbabwe’s public broadcaster, dedicated 37 
minutes of news bulletin to ZANU-PF coverage while all opposition candidates shared a 
paltry four minutes amongst themselves’ (DA, 2008:5). This clearly indicates the unfairness 
of distribution of airtime in favour of the governing party. 
Turning now to the election day itself, there are certainly questionable events regarding 
the freeness and fairness of the process. Nonetheless, first of all, the conditions during the 
casting of votes were plausible. The number of polling stations was in order, and the 
condition of them and the election materials were sufficiently supplied for. However, in 
numerous cases, voters were turned away to other wards or constituencies. Secondly, election 
observation was ambiguous; only countries friendly to the Zimbabwean government were 
invited and there were only two accreditation centers; one in Harare and one in Bulawayo. 
Thirdly, there was an issue with the postal votes. Postal votes are votes meant for security 
forces, diplomats out of the country and some civil servants who would be on duty on 
election day. Eight thousand people applied for these postal votes; however, some 600,000 
postal ballots were printed. This leaves much room for the possibility of fraud. The biggest 
problems regarding the freeness and fairness of the process, started when the announcement 
of the results was heavily delayed. Only a staggering five weeks after election day were 
results were made public. Major unrest was the result of the delay, and EISA reports on the 
development of the following worrying trends: 
 
„The long period of awaiting the results saw a range of trends regarding the presidential 
result emerging. These included: 
• It was understood that the ZANU-PF Politburo was briefed on Friday 4 April 2008 (six 
days after the election and with regard to the result of the presidential election) that 
Tsvangirai had won 47.7%, compared with 43.4% for Mugabe and the remainder for Simba 
Makoni. Another report suggested that by 2 April ZANU-PF had completed its projection and 
arrived at 43% for Mugabe and 48.3% for Tsvangirai. 
• The MDC‟s initial projection indicated that the opposition party had only won a simple 
majority. Later on, MDC projected an absolute majority. Its own calculation of presidential 
race results came to the conclusion that Tsvangirai had won 50.2% of the vote (against 
43.8% for Mugabe). Yet, many reports confirmed that the party had little certainty that this 
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result was reliable. It had confirmed to various sources that it would be prepared to enter the 
presidential run-off race (also to the South African embassy in Zimbabwe). 
• The Independent Results Centre (IRC, 2008), based on a complete PVT, forecast 50.3% for 
Tsvangirai (although its percentages excluded the results of one constituency and the 
percentage vote won by presidential candidate Towungana). 
• The ZESN vote projection, based on a sample of constituencies, received much publicity. 
However, ZESN responses at a Harare media and observer briefing of 1 April 2008 (2008b) 
revealed sampling flaws in that their universe of sampling was based on the officially 
announced polling stations and did (could) not take account of the last-minute proliferation 
of polling stations‟. (www.eisa.org) 
 
 
It was clear that many speculations were made before the announcement. On 2 May, results 
were announced with 47.9 percent of votes in favor of Tsvangirai and 43.2 percent of votes 
for President Mugabe. A run-off was warranted. The question arises immediately, if President 
Mugabe rigged the elections, why did he not immediately make himself the winner, 
preventing a run-off. The answer to this question may be difficult to grasp and understand, 
but one thing was for sure, President Mugabe was going to make sure he would win the run-
off elections. ZANU-PF launched a nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation. The 
Crisis Group reported that over 2,000 people were detained and 200,000 misplaced (2008). 
The run-off elections were to be far from free and fair. 
The most remarkable aspect which confirms the unfair process is the fact that Morgan 
Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off elections. He was arrested five times during the month 
of June and in his announcement to withdrawal stated, ‘In my considered view, the conditions 
presently obtaining throughout the country make it virtually impossible for a proper election 
envisaged in both the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Electoral Act [Chapter 2.13] to take 
place. This being the case, the election scheduled for Friday 27th June 2008 cannot be an 
election as provided for by our law and accordingly, it will be a nullity if it were to be 
proceeded with’ (www.eisa.org). Additionally, he stated in his letter: 
 
„What has been going on in this country immediately after the elections held on the 29th 
March 2008 is a clear testimony that the elections scheduled for the 27
th
 June 2008 cannot be 
held efficiently, freely, fairly, transparently and in accordance with the law. On the 21st May 
2008, after having noted the sad events that were happening, I instructed my Legal 
Practitioners Dube Manikai & Hwacha to write a letter to you setting out in detail various 
concerns which were an impediment to the holding of a free and fair election‟ (www.eisa.org) 
 
As a result, the second round of elections was won by President Mugabe by 90,22 percent of 
the votes. This clearly is a dubious result and outcome. 
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4.4 Political and Electoral System  
 
Before commencing with the discussion on the current political and electoral system, a brief 
section will firstly be devoted to the political changes since 1980. After independence both 
government and leadership personnel changed. The Lancaster Independence constitution 
placed restrictions on socio-economic redistribution as well as major constitutional change 
before 1990. However, the combination of new political leaders and the old system proved 
insufficient to the prevention of conflict. The new Zimbabwe was left with the inheritance of 
the structures of the colony. ‘The post-1980 state under the ZANU-PF did not break with 
either the tradition of nationalist authoritarianism and violence or the methods and techniques 
of past colonial settler oppression’ (EISA, 2008:2).  
Although ZANU-PF won the 1980 elections with great majority support, there remained a 
20 percent support for the rivalling party, PF-ZAPU. In a strange way, namely through the 
use of force, there was an attempt to create national unity between 1980 and 1987. ZANU-PF 
more or less gave PF-ZAPU the ‘choice’ to dissolve or merge; the latter was the case in 1987. 
The conflict in Matabeleland provinces, where the majority of the 20 percent Ndebele 
supporters resided, was therewith resolved, but all the power now lay in the hands of ZANU-
PF. 
The regularity of elections since 1980 has been very plausible; however, all elections have 
been flawed. And even though there were restrictions on constitutional changes, plenty were 
made throughout the 1980s. One of which, in 1987, entailed the replacement of ceremonial 
Presidency by Executive Presidency. Provisional rights were further made for eight seats of 
provincial governors, ten chiefs and 12 presidential nominees in the House of Assembly 
(EISA, 2008). With regards to party politics, a number of opposition forces fragmented into 
parties such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), the Democratic Party (DP) and the 
Forum Party (FP). However, these opposition parties proved weak against the ZANU-PF 
which was using state resources for campaigning and other undemocratic means.  
Throughout the 2000s, elections were more and more marked with extreme violence and 
the true start of contemporary politics in Zimbabwe was made. ZANU-PF drafted a 
constitution and a referendum was organized. President Mugabe clearly led the ‘yes’ 
campaign, whereas Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led the ‘no’ 
campaign. It was rejected by 54.3 percent of votes against 45.7 percent.  
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Table 3:  The 2000 Constitutional Referendum per Province 
Province  No Vote Yes Vote Total 
Harare  218,298 73,410 291,708 
Bulawayo  90,422 27,737 118,159 
Mashonaland Central  43,385 96,661 140,046 
Mashonaland East  39,930 60,354 100,284 
Mashonaland West  53,328 75,251 128,597 
Manicaland  67,787 38,993 106,780 
Masvingo  49,658 61,927 111,585 
Midlands  70,572 91,587 162,159 
Matabeleland North  31,224 26,413 57,637 
Matabeleland South  31,759 33,606 65,365 
NATIONAL  696,363 585,939 1,282,302 
Vote proportions  45.69% 54.31% 100% 
Source: http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/zimomr08.pdf 
 
 
From that moment on especially, ZANU-PF’s position was threatened and more extreme 
measures to guarantee re-election were taken. Among others, the so-called war veterans and 
youth militia were deployed throughout the country, intimidating, abusing, and using 
violence to ensure votes. The March 2002 presidential elections, despite suspicions of being 
rigged, consolidated presidential power in the face of a strong opposition vote. It was one of 
the most oppressive elections of the decade, and showed that ZANU-PF had for the time 
being thwarted the opposition assault of the beginning of the 2000s (EISA, 2008). In 2002, it 
came to a point that Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations due to 
human rights abuses during the land redistribution as well as tampering with elections. As a 
consequence, in 2003, Zimbabwe withdrew its membership from the Commonwealth. More 
importantly, and with a major impact, was the launch of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’. With 
little to no warning, the government of Zimbabwe launched this operation intended to clean 
up cities. A report by the United Nations focussing on Operation Murambatsvina quotes:  
 
“Popularly referred to as “Operation Tsunami” because of its speed and ferocity it resulted 
in the destruction of homes, business premises and vending sites. It is estimated that some 
700,000 people in cities across the country have lost either their homes, their source of 
livelihood or both. Indirectly, a further 2.4 million people have been affected in varying 
degrees. Hundreds of thousands of women, men and children were made homeless, without 
access to food, water and sanitation, or health care. Education for thousands of school age 
children has been disrupted. Many of the sick, including those with HIV and AIDS, no longer 
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have access to care. The vast majority of those directly and indirectly affected are the poor 
and disadvantaged segments of the population. They are, today, deeper in poverty, 
deprivation and destitution, and have been rendered more vulnerable”  
(United Nations, Tibaijuka, 2005:7) 
 
The most significant aspect about this, regarding the topic of this thesis, is that this operation 
was launched during a time of persistent budget deficits, critical food and fuel shortages and 
triple-digit inflation. The operation drew a lot of international attention; donors withdrew and 
the country’s crisis grew bigger and bigger. 
As the dangerous violence continued to ravage the country, the economy dropped, and in 
2007, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) initiated a mediation to stop the 
political violence. The mediation was mainly initiated because of numerous highly violent 
attacks on the opposition. The primary goal of the mediation, led by former South African 
president, Thabo Mbeki, was to establish conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair 
elections in 2008. Additionally, the goal was to ensure that whatever outcome the election 
presented, this would be accepted and respected. Towards the end of 2007 some progress 
seemed to be made, and a series of amendments to the country’s constitutional and legal 
framework were proposed. Although the process was slow, it secured modest achievements, 
‘including amendments to the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, the 
Public Order and Security Act, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and 
the broadcasting Services Act’ (Matlosa, 2008:211). These reform measures led to the 
amendment of the Constitution to give effect to the changes. However, in the midst of the 
negotiations ZANU-PF called an election in March 2008. The two MDC factions protested 
the announcement of the election date before a constitutional review process had taken place, 
while ZANU-PF insisted the elections would go ahead, leading to a deadlock in the 
negotiations (Matlosa, 2008:211). The forthcoming major election violence is a black page in 
the history of Zimbabwe.  
Although rather straightforward and factual, the following elaboration on Zimbabwe’s 
electoral system is in place in order to fully comprehend the political agenda. When looking 
at Zimbabwe’s current electoral system, although not often adhered to, it is important to 
briefly touch upon the first observation regarding the amendments of the Constitution. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe was amended in 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, 
1996, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007, leading to a total of 12 times. Constitutional amendment 
number 18, for example, provides for significant changes in Zimbabwe’s electoral 
dispensation. ‘The amendment set out the framework to harmonize presidential and 
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parliamentary elections, to reduce the presidential term of office from 6 years to 5, to increase 
the number of seats in the House of Assembly and in the Senate, to empower parliament to 
serve as an electoral college should the office of president become vacant for any reason, and 
to empower the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to delimit parliamentary and local 
constituencies’ (US Department of State, 2011). The question remains of course, whether 
these amendments are made in order to keep up appearances, or to truly build on a better 
democracy. The House of Assembly counts 210 single-member plurality constituencies, the 
Senate 60 single-member plurality seats (six in each province), 16 elected by chiefs, two each 
from the eight non-metropolitan provinces and the President is elected by universal adult 
franchise, with absolute majority required. The election period is every five years. The 
electoral institute is the ZEC and on paper its duties are to demarcate the boundaries of the 
constituencies; the preparation of and conducting of elections and preparations; it directs 
voter registration; is responsible for voter education and ensures that the elections are 
conducted efficiently, freely, fairly, transparently and in accordance with the law. Voter 
registration is voluntary and continuous, voters must present identity cards and proof of 
residence and are issued with registration certificates. Campaigning is done subject to code of 
conduct, laid down in law, but with no penalties attached to violations. The announcement of 
results is done by the presiding officer, and a copy of the results is to be posted outside the 
polling station. Lastly, monitoring is done by persons accredited by the ZEC, subject to code 
of conduct.  
 
4.5 International Assistance 
 
As mentioned above, international observers are on invite by the host government only. Only 
then, certain monitoring privileges are granted. The Zimbabwean government invited certain 
countries to observe; however, only countries that were friendly to the Zimbabwean regime. 
Therewith, all members of the SADC, but not its Parliamentary Forum, was invited, as these 
were not guaranteed to be friendly to the Zimbabwean regime; and they would probably be 
highly critical. Additionally, a selection of other African countries, a selection of Eurasian 
countries and a selection of Latin American countries were invited to observe and monitor. In 
the end, only South Africa did indeed go to Zimbabwe. Among the countries that were 
excluded from observation were the European Union and all member states, the United States 
of America and the Commonwealth. From these listings it is clear to interpret that indeed the 
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critical, highly democratized countries were excluded. See Table 4 for further specification. 
This gives reason to suspicion. For the run-off election, the same list applied.   
  
Table 4: International Election Observers to the 2008 Harmonized Elections 
Uninvited Delegations Invited to send observers Not invited but present 
      
International and regional African Union (AU), the Pan African European Union (EU), and SADC 
organisations Parliament Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) 
  (PAP), SADC secretariat,   
  SADC – Electoral Commissions Forum   
  (SADC-ECF), the Common Market for   
  Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),   
  the Non-Aligned Movement (NUM),   
  Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP),   
  Association of South East Asian Nations   
  (ASEAN), East African Community, Economic   
  Community of West Africa States   
  (ECOWAS), Economic Community of   
  Central African States (ECCAS), East   
  African Community (EAC), Caribbean   
  Community (CARICOM), Inter-Governmental   
  Authority on Development (IGAD)   
  and MAGHREB Union, Community of   
  Lusophone Countries (CPLP).   
Countries, including SADC: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Japan, Australia, Norway, United States 
all Southern African Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, of America, United Kingdom (US and 
Development Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, British embassies accredited in Harare 
Community Members Tanzania, Zambia; Rest of Africa: Algeria, sent teams throughout the country as 
  Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, election ‘witnesses’ 
  Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda; Eurasia:   
  China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,   
  Russia; Latin America: Brazil, Jamaica,   
  Nicaragua, Venezuela   
Non-governmental December 12 Movement Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
organisations   (EISA) 
Political parties and African National Congress (South Africa), Congress of South African Trade Unions 
trade unions Chama Chama Mapinduzi (Tanzania) & (COSATU), Southern African Trade 
  FRELIMO (Mozambique) Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC) 
    and Young Communist League (South 
    Africa) 
 
Source: http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/zimomr08.pdf 
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Zimbabwe’s own Election Commission (ZEC) is by law responsible for the accreditation of 
observers. Even though international observers were hardly welcome, the role of the domestic 
ZEC could still prove vital. The vital aspect clearly would be the legitimacy of this 
commission. EISA reports, ‘In practice, the Ministry of Justice exercises sole authority over 
the invitation and accreditation of local observers; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the 
power to invite international observers. The ZEC rubberstamps the invitations from the two 
ministries. These processes, along with the Ministry of Justice’s delayed accreditation of 
approximately 8,000 domestic observers, were ‘selective, discriminatory and shrouded in a 
cloud of secrecy’ (EISA, 2008c: 3). 
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) is a legally established citizen rights 
group. It is widely respected and in compliance with the country’s electoral laws, code of 
conduct and international principles for election observation (www.zesn.org.zw). Members of 
the organization have been arbitrarily detained and questioned by police as well as police 
searching their offices. 
In sum, no legitimate monitoring or observations were made in the 2008 Zimbabwean 
elections. The minimal transparency of the process is a major indicator of a lack of a 
democracy and the opportunity for rigging is widely present. 
 
4.6 Socio-Economic Factors  
 
Zimbabwe was once a country with huge economic potential. Its rich soil attracted many 
settlers, firstly for natural resources and secondly for agricultural businesses. Many settlers 
established farms which became prosperous businesses. At independence a few thousand 
white farmers still occupied around 15.5 million hectares of land. This large-scale farming 
contributed to 40 percent of export earnings and 90 percent of food on local markets (Crisis 
Group, 2004:32). Zimbabwe’s economy was functioning well, with high potential; 
Zimbabwe’s economy in 2011, however, is a catastrophe.  
Before elaborating on how Zimbabwe’s economy became what it is, first some facts about 
the current situation: Zimbabwe has approximately 12,000,000 inhabitants; the HIV/Aids 
prevalence rate is 14.3 percent; HIV/Aids deaths are estimated to be around 83.000 yearly; 
GDP per capita is US$500, and a shocking 95 percent of the population is unemployed; 68 
percent of the population lives below the poverty line and Zimbabwe’s public debt is at 149 
percent of GDP. The main agricultural products can be found in corn, cotton, tobacco, wheat, 
coffee, sugarcane, peanuts, sheep, goats and pigs. Zimbabwe exports around US$2.5 billion 
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and imports around US$ 4.000 billion (CIA, 2011). The Zimbabwean official currency is the 
United States Dollar. In sum, Zimbabwe is struggling. 
What happened? The main explanatory factor for the poor economy is a political land 
reform policy initiated by President Mugabe since the 1980s. It can practically be divided 
into two periods: one from 1980 – 2000, where the principle of willing buyer, willing seller 
was applied with financial backing from Great Britain, and the second, President Mugabe’s 
harsh fast-track reform plan. 
The first period was marked by farmers who were willing to sell their farms, and the 
government who was willing to buy them. The need for reform came mostly from a need for 
a more equal distribution of the land. As a donor official notes, ‘there was never a shortage of 
land in this country. There was a need to deal with the equity issue, and much of the land was 
underutilized’ (Crisis Group, 2004:33). As it indeed turned out later in a survey, more then 
3.8 million hectares of land in 18 commercial farming areas were identified as underutilized 
based on three criteria: population density per square kilometer, planted area as percentage 
area of total area and hectares per head of cattle. ‘Thus from the start the government had 
substantial land available for purchase and redistribution – almost one third of the amount 
necessary to resettle its goal of 162,000 families (Crisis Group, 2004:33). The government set 
ambitious targets and speeded up the process. However, these targets turned out to be too 
ambitious and were not accomplished. Furthermore, the program and strategic thinking was 
not set out in the plans. There was no structure or well established guidelines on how to 
proceed after purchasing the land. Although Zimbabwe received financial aid from Great 
Britain, the real costs lay in the unforeseen, and therewith never recognized training of 
peasants to become farmers. ‘More costly and more complicated was turning landless 
peasants into successful farmers, which required technical training, extension services and 
reliable infrastructure (e.g. roads, schools, and health clinics)’ (Crisis Group, 2004:33). 
Production of food consequently fell. Until today, banks are reluctant to extend loans to new 
farmers as they have no skills to work the farm. Many of the once-flourishing farms now 
remain unused and are in heavy decay. 
In 1992, the Land Acquisition Act was enacted with its purpose of speeding up the land 
reform process. The Act had several implications, among others, the limitation of farm size, 
and the government was now allowed to forcibly buy land against a fair compensation. The 
‘fair compensation’ was to be provided for by Zimbabwe’s former rulers, the United 
Kingdom. Not only land which was underutilized, but full-blown well-working farms were 
now targeted by the government. The violence was immense; many white farmers left 
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Zimbabwe in fear for their lives as many farms were attacked. Meanwhile, political and 
economic crises succeeded one another. The details are horrifying and go on and on, but 
without going into too much detail, land reform under President Mugabe might just be the 
major political issue responsible for much of Zimbabwe’s trouble.  
A few farmers who were backing ZANU-PF were spared and were still farming. It is 
estimated that about 300 to 400 farmers out of the once 4,500 have remained on their farms 
since the fast-track land reform in 2000, even though often having to give up huge parts of 
their land. As a consequence, food production was basically non-existent and Zimbabwe was 
facing a food shortage.  
Relating back to the possible connection to electoral violence, a few remarks are in place. 
In 1998 – among numerous other examples – rising food prices sparked off major riots in 
Harare. The police used teargas to disperse the masses and officials were quick to point 
fingers at the farmers. However, the financial crisis and plummeting exchange rates due to 
malfunctioning of the government and mismanagement of the economy were the most 
obvious driving forces behind the inflation. The protests also marked the first time the 
Zimbabwean army was mobilized since independence. President Mugabe’s governance 
brought the whole Zimbabwean economy to collapse. In August 2001, the World Food 
Program (WFP) even placed Zimbabwe under the status of an ‘exceptional food emergency’. 
‘In November 2001, the WFP announced plans to begin large-scale food deliveries, even as 
the government made it illegal for more than 1,000 farmers to tend their fields and gave them 
three months to leave’ (Crisis Group, 2004:100). Furthermore, the land reform was 
excessively used by President Mugabe to gain votes. As he claimed to have initiated the land 
claims and land occupations to return it to its ‘original rightful Zimbabwean’ owners, 
President Mugabe’s slogan during the campaigning period was ‘Defending Our Land and 
Sovereignty’ (Ansell, 2008:1). Additionally, post-election, on the 25 April, whilst addressing 
a trade fair Mugabe stated, ‘Let the colonists know this is the final solution. The land reform 
programme under which thousands of Zimbabweans were allocated land taken from the white 
minority is the final solution to the land question and will never be reversed . . . We are 
simply claiming our birth right, defending our hard won sovereignty . . . Better all those who 
shake and quiver at every word of our colonial masters please know Zimbabwe will never be 
for sale . . . and will never be a colony again’ (Ansell, 2008:3). This harsh statement indicates 
President Mugabe’s intention to use his land reform act to secure votes. Lastly, it will be 
interesting to observe the effect during the upcoming elections of the new Indigenization and 
Economic Empowerment Law implemented by President Mugabe. This Law forces white 
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business executives in Zimbabwe ‘to ensure that blacks have a 51% controlling interest in 
their companies within the next five years’ (Sapa, 2010). Although it is a widely criticized 
plan, analysts predict a complete withdrawal of business; it seems as if it is part of President 
Mugabe’s attempt to win votes. 
In sum, Zimbabwe’s political landscape has witnessed many deaths, many abuses, and 
much violence, and has caused millions of Zimbabweans to flee the country to neighboring 
states. The situation is severe, and a report written for the United States Congress on the 
matter even reports that the call for protests against the 2008 rigged election on the day of the 
announcement by the opposition was unsuccessful because of the low turnout. People were 
intimidated, afraid and stayed at home; or as some analysts have concluded, many 
Zimbabweans did not join the protests as they could not miss a day of work and therewith a 
day of wage (CRS Report for Congress, 2008). 
  
4.7 Ethnicity 
 
Zimbabwe has two major ethnic groups; firstly, Shona which represents some 75 percent of 
the country’s population, and secondly, Ndebele, which represents some 20 percent of the 
population. The remaining population consists of mixed, Asian and white minorities.  
There have been two major ethnic clashes in the history of Zimbabwe. Both of them have 
been discussed in the foregoing chapters. First it is important to mention that President 
Mugabe is Shona. His ZANU-PF is a Shona party. His former competition, ZAPU, was 
primarily Ndebele. The first act of political violence against an ethnic group was during the 
brutal conflict in Matabeleland, homeland of the Ndebele ethnic group. Mugabe ordered the 
fearsome North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland where it looted, raped and 
murdered. ‘The death toll may have reached some 25,000 people in a devastating campaign 
known as the Gukurahundi, meaning the wind that blows the chaff away after the harvest’ 
(Dowden, 2009:140). Mugabe intended to crush the Ndebele who represented the gap 
between his 57 out of 80-seat majority in the 1980 election. As mentioned, as a result, ZAPU 
and ZANU merged in the name of national unity, but in effect ZAPU disappeared. The 
Shona-led ZANU became the sole party and only those Ndebele who submitted to its rule 
were allowed a public role. Many supporters of ZAPU were tortured and imprisoned. 
Secondly, the brutal removal of the white farmers by President Mugabe in the name of 
more equal land distribution for its indigenous people is regarded as a racial issue. President 
Mugabe clearly wanted the white farmers to give up everything they owned and leave the 
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country. The British government was held responsible by President Mugabe to compensate 
the farmers; if they would not do it there would be none. It was a brutal campaign with little 
nuance and tactics. The whites were to go, ‘and then we’ll see’ almost seemed to be President 
Mugabe’s motto. The secret police would march into farmlands, kill animals, destroy crops 
and burn buildings. One of the farm owners stated, ‘I would not have minded so much if my 
own farmworkers had taken over the farm. At least they know how to run it’ (Dowden, 
2009:149). However, those who were directed to take over the farm barely knew how to be 
subsistence farmers.  
A discriminatory land policy caused the majority of white farmers to flee the country. 
President Mugabe got his way; the question remains how well he had thought about the 
devastating economic consequences this would have on his Zimbabwe. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 after troublesome, long and difficult negotiations 
with Britain. President Mugabe was elected and has ruled the country ever since. His political 
choices have been one of the most discussed in the world. Although all his elections have 
been conducted as scheduled, none of them have been free or fair. During the 2008 elections, 
intimidation and violence targeting the opposition were present from day to day. This form of 
electoral violence dominates in Zimbabwean history. Aside from this, unfair distribution of 
broadcasting time and the prevention of opposition rallies form part of President Mugabe’s 
path of choice. The heavy delay of the elections was the main reason for suspicion. It is made 
clear that Zimbabwe’s political regulations and institutions have little value. President 
Mugabe does as he pleases and there is little to no democratic transparency. The legitimacy 
of the process is therewith easily questioned and the fact that President Mugabe is very 
reluctant to international observers is another indication of poor democratic governance. 
The roots of Zimbabwe’s violence may very well lie in President Mugabe’s rule. He 
started the ethnic war on the Ndebele, and he started the land reform policies which lie at the 
very heart of Zimbabwe’s devastated economy. His speech given at independence has been 
nothing but thin air. The words spoken, ‘the wrong of the past must now stand forgiven and 
forgotten. If we ever look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely 
that oppression and racism are inequalities that must never find scope in our political and 
social system. It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppresses us 
yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have 
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power’ (Dowden, 2009:135), might just indicate the exact opposite of President Mugabe’s 
intentions from the start. 
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Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the core of this study, namely the analysis of the factors discussed in 
the previous chapters and its possible causality. Before commencing with the main analysis, 
the sequence of events surrounding the resolution of the electoral violence in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe will now be presented. This is incorporated in this thesis as it sheds additional 
light on where the violence stemmed from. After this, a discussion on the comparative 
analysis is presented. 
 
5.2 Conflict Resolution 
 
The end result of the elections in both Kenya and Zimbabwe to bring an end to the violence 
was the creation of a power-sharing arrangement. Table 5 below highlights the new formation 
of the two governments. In the case of Zimbabwe, President Mugabe from the ZANU-PF 
positioned members of the MDC in the Cabinet, and in Kenya, President Kibaki positioned 
his main opposition party. the ODM, in the Cabinet. In both cases, the main opposition party 
was thus incorporated into the Cabinet which soothed the population and brought an end to 
the continuing violence. 
 
Table 5: Zimbabwe and Kenya Cabinet 
 
(Source: Shale, 2009:89) 
 
There are mixed opinions on the fruitfulness of power-sharing agreements as governing form; 
it is, however, often regarded as a, at least for a short time, mechanism for the resolution of 
post-election conflict. Shale regards it as a negative trend in his contribution Power Sharing 
as a Mechanism for Managing Conflicts in Africa: A Cure or a Curse? and states, ‘a 
disturbing trend in recent years has been that politicians have adopted an alternative, non-
Zimbabwe Kenya
President Mugabe President Kibaki (PNU)
Two Vice-Presidents (both from ZANU-PF) Vice President (ODM)
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai Prime Minister (Odinga from ODM)
2 Deputy Ministers (Arthur Mutambara and a member of MDC-Tsvangirai 2 Deputy Prime Ministers
31 Ministers (15 from ZANU-PF, 13 from MDC-Tsvangirai and 3 from MDC-Mutambara) 37 Ministers
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electoral approach, capturing power through negotiated power-sharing deals disguised as 
mechanisms for peace and political stability’ (2009:81).   
Both the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe somewhat illustrate this. In Kenya, the 
presidential candidate, Kibaki, who by all indications clearly had lost the elections, held onto 
his position as president through a negotiated settlement which established a new position of 
prime minister to accommodate his rival, Odinga, and his supporters. The newly formed 
government was to represent national unity, especially aimed at unity amongst the conflicting 
ethnic groups.  
In the case of Zimbabwe, the same is true, albeit in a slightly different form. President 
Mugabe also manipulated the elections and rigged himself into staying in power, but when 
the opposition and the violence became too harsh, he faced a legitimacy crisis and gave in to 
pressures to talk to the opposition about power-sharing. Again in this case, national unity was 
to be represented through the creation of the positions of prime minister and deputy prime 
minister employed by opposition members. In Zimbabwe, two positions were created to 
accommodate the opposition, as the MDC was split into the Tsvangirai faction and the 
Mutambara faction. In a way, it can thus be argued that these agreements were to serve in the 
best interest of the political elites. Through this agreement the legitimacy crisis of President 
Mugabe was reduced as Zimbabweans in a way got what they voted for. Meanwhile, the 
consequences for the sustainability of democratic governance through these power-sharing 
agreements are extensive as they further empower the already powerful elites and further 
disempower the people. The other side of the coin is closely related to Arend Lijphardt’s 
popularized consociational theory which argues that power-sharing is a necessary condition 
for the survival of democracy in divided societies. Lijphart believed that ‘in a plural society 
characterized by sharp religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial and ethnic 
cleavages the political process is often marred by hostilities and anxieties, hence the need to 
thwart the dangers that surround such a political process’ (Shale, 2009:84). As discussed in 
the foregoing chapters, both Kenya and Zimbabwe have an extensive history in social and 
ethnic cleavages. However, both countries have also proven to be facing serious flaws in the 
legitimacy of the electoral systems and the production of democratic institutions. Aside from 
the validity of Lijphardt’s theory, a legitimate political and electoral system is still a pre-
condition for the proper functioning of a democracy, regardless of a possible divided and 
unequal society. 
Keeping the above in mind, the five factors will now be further analysed and compared 
between Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
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5.3 Causal Factors: Backgrounds Facts 
 
The first similarity between Kenya and Zimbabwe in this comparison is that both Kenya and 
Zimbabwe are former British colonies. The relationship in this regard between the two 
countries is mainly related to the legacy of unequal land distribution which was left by the 
British colonial rule. Additionally, the lack of involvement of Africans in national politics 
during the colonial time was the case in both Kenya and Zimbabwe and left its scars. 
In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the most fertile land was ‘given’ to the white settlers. Not 
only did this have major implications for the economic prosperity for the Africans, it also 
created tensions between the different ethnic groups. 
Starting off the analysis of this thesis with regards to the colonial legacy, the consequences 
for electoral violence are multiple, but in sum and related, land, economic marginalization 
and ethnic marginalization. In Kenya, many ethnic groups suffered from land-loss, especially 
the Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin and Maasai. In Zimbabwe, this was mainly the Ndebele in 
Matabeleland. The consequences have been fierce; among the most important are economic 
stagnation and tensions between the groups. Aside from the factor of ethnicity in the current 
election violence, throughout the years, many clashes in Kenya and Zimbabwe have taken 
place between different ethnic groups. The colonial legacy is herewith the first causal factor 
which is identified. The implications will further be discussed along the lines of the 
discussion per factor. 
 
5.4 Causal Factors: Free and Fair Elections 
 
First of all, free and fair elections will be examined. It is widely recognized that the elections 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe were both rigged. During the campaigning period in Kenya it is 
reported that state resources for funding of the Kibaki campaign were widely used, as well as 
money for the distribution of gifts. In Zimbabwe, this was exactly the same, but in addition, 
President Mugabe received considerably more broadcasting time then his opposition, 
Tsvangirai. A difference between the two countries during the campaigning period lies in 
freedom of speech. In Kenya this was fairly respected, although a strong ethno-political 
polarization between the two main contenders was widely present. This also led to several 
ethnic clashes in this period. In Zimbabwe, relative freedom in basic aspects such as the 
freedom of wearing the t-shirt of one’s party preference was tolerated; however, the police 
hindered many opposition rallies, attacks by the Chipangano at the opposition were widely 
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reported and in some instances people were forced to attend President Mugabe’s rallies. One 
thing which therefore stands out in this case is that in Zimbabwe, the campaigning period 
was, to a much higher level, influenced top-down through intimidation and therewith 
attempting to influence the choice of vote on election day. In Kenya, however, the 
campaigning period was more coloured by tensions amongst the population and different 
ethnic groups themselves without too much intimidation form the top. 
Election day itself was marked by high levels of malfunctioning democratic institutions in 
both countries. Kenya did invite international observers; Zimbabwe did not, but EISA did go 
anyway, and in both elections conclusions were drawn by the different observers that there 
was a strong lack of transparency. In Kenya, this was mainly highlighted by the non-signing 
of the statutory forms by all Party Agents and the dubious circumstances under which these 
were delivered, namely copies. Also, the inability of the ECK to reach or get in touch with 
the Returning Officers, even though sufficient means were provided to reach them, are signs 
of rigging. In Zimbabwe, seeing the fact that only Zimbabwe-friendly observers were invited, 
and hardly anyone of these actually came, the legitimacy of the events on election day are 
questioned. Additionally, the postal votes raise considerable questions. The fact that 
Zimbabwe printed around 600,000 postal ballot papers, whilst only having around 8,000 
Zimbabweans abroad, is dubious. Lastly, in both cases the announcements of the result were 
heavily delayed. In Kenya, minutes after the announcement of the winner, heavy violence 
broke out. A delay in counting votes is one of the first signs of a rigged election.  
The failure of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean governments to legitimize their elections 
caused suspicion, opposition and protests. Further implementation of democratic governance 
will provide for the electoral environment in which they conduct non-violent elections, or at 
least enhancing the chances of non-violent elections, are present. As the example of the 
Florida case has indicated, with proper democratic regulations, violence is the last means to 
be called upon by the people when experiencing doubtful results. 
 
5.5 Causal Factors: Political and Electoral System 
 
Second of all, heavily connected and subject to more in-depth analysis, is the political and 
electoral system in both countries. It has been discussed that in Kenya and Zimbabwe the 
electoral system and the legal framework are lacking in legitimacy. In the case of Kenya for 
example, no regulations exist surrounding the length of the campaigning period and there is 
no maximum for registered voters per polling station. Additionally, and to this thesis of high 
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importance, Kenya’s regulations regarding the resolution of electoral disputes are inadequate 
as complaints can only be handed in 28 days after the announcement of results. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the level of transparency was even worse, which indicates an even lower level of 
democracy. Zimbabwe’s legal framework is relatively in place; however, as mentioned, the 
rules and regulations are hardly adhered to. 
These deficiencies in both democracies are evaluated as one of the major causal factors 
for election violence. As Khadiagala’s theory on the fourth wave of democracy indicated 
above describes, African democracies need to deepen, strengthen and legitimize their 
electoral process. Although electoral processes might be only one instrument of democracy, it 
is the basis of a democracy. When people are able to freely participate in public life, 
participate in the political arena, and choose their leaders through a free and fair process, they 
feel less urge to make their voices heard through violence.  
As previously discussed, Africa’s democratization process was a hasty one and no proper 
attention was given to the integration and consolidation – if at all possible – during the 
transition period towards a democracy of its institutions and democratic legislature. The 
conducting of elections seems to have replaced the democratic spirit and African leaders have 
interpreted the holding of elections now and then as sufficient in order for their country to 
count as a democracy, i.e. the aforementioned quantity-quality debate. However, democracy 
is much more than just the ritual of voting and elections. Democracy ‘is the plurality of 
opinions, freedom of expression, multi-party political system, political competition, free and 
universal multi-party elections, fundamental and human rights, rule of law and accountability 
of the rulers which constitute democracy’ (Gebrewold: in Francis, 2008:149). According to 
Thomson, the constituent elements that are considered to be the most important for 
democratization are ‘a credible opposition, a strong civil society, strong economies, 
separation of state and ruling party, regime change through democratic elections, addressing 
the challenges of ethnic mobilization, dealing with the threat of the military, establishing 
political culture, shared political ideas, attitudes and belief that underlie a society’ (Fischer, 
2008:149). Few of these aspects, if any, can be found in either Kenya or in Zimbabwe. Paul 
Collier, in his Wars, Guns and Votes. Democracy in Dangerous Places, refers to these 
African democracies not as a democracy, but as democrazy (2010:15). He explains himself 
by arguing that a democracy ‘does not merely have competitive elections, it also has rules of 
conduct for these elections: cheating gets punished. A proper democracy also has checks and 
balances that limit the power of a government once elected: it cannot crush the defeated’ 
(2010:15). In Zimbabwe, the case of the attempt to crush the opposition was clearly present. 
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Kenya and Zimbabwe differ slightly in that respect as Kenya has seen three presidents since 
independence, whereas Zimbabwe has had only President Mugabe. President Mugabe clearly 
has an addiction to power and he exercises this by conducting harsh and cruel regime. There 
is no room for institutions, democratic consolidation or any form of legitimacy for otherwise 
he understands very well, he might not be re-elected. Another resemblance between the two 
countries is found in the delay; although in Zimbabwe a greater delay than in Kenya, the 
announcement of the results was done later than the law prescribes.  
There is a structural relationship between the inadequate functioning of political and 
electoral systems and violence surrounding them. Uncertainties, doubts about the 
trustworthiness of the system, the unknown and the feeling of injustice done by the governing 
elite towards the citizens are features which are hardly present in proper democracies. When 
and if these features and feelings are experienced, it will not be because the population is 
cheated upon, but the democratic vote of the people. 
 
5.6 Causal Factors: International Assistance 
 
Thirdly, the factor of international assistance is to be discussed. At first sight it seems to have 
little relation to the electoral violence. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that Kenya 
did invite observers who were present extensively throughout the electoral process, whilst 
Zimbabwe was heavily opposed to this and did not invite any international observers. In both 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, however, violent conflict broke out. International assistance and 
observation contribute to free and fair elections, which in turn contributes to peace and 
security. More importantly, as mentioned, there are several forms of international assistance, 
not least one which assists in all aspects of the election. In other words, long-standing 
democracies, with experience in what is right and what is wrong in an electoral process, are 
sent to assist in the whole process. For countries in transition, or put more mildly, countries 
that have not yet established a full democracy, this should be welcomed and embraced. The 
fact that Zimbabwe did not invite any international entities, predicts something about 
President Mugabe’s intentions. President Mugabe had no intentions to comply with the set 
rules and regulations surrounding a free and fair election. He is one of the longest serving 
leaders on the African continent, and nothing points towards the direction that he is willing to 
give up his position. Taken that President Mugabe is so reluctant to invite international 
observers, and therewith reluctant to learn about and improve democratic governance, is 
reason for Zimbabweans to mistrust their political spheres and leader.  
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In Kenya, the government did invite international entities to observe. At some of the most 
crucial moments of the election, however, they were not allowed to observe. Additionally, 
Kenya’s political players seem to pretend to believe in democratic governance by the signing 
of several international treaties; in reality, however, the leaders bent the rules in a way which 
suited them. They have bent the rules in such a way that will get the right person in the right 
place. 
The different arenas around international assistance in Kenya and Zimbabwe show the 
perspective of two sides; one in which international observers were invited, against the other 
one in which the choice of international observers might just as well be regarded as none. In 
both cases violence broke out. It is crucial in order for international assistance to be efficient, 
that the people in charge of the electoral process truly want the assistance and truly want to 
learn and improve, instead of pretentious acts. The ‘scary’ aspect for the governing elite when 
allowing international observers or receiving assistance is that they will then truly be held 
accountable for the choices they have made during their rule. The outcome of the elections 
will be the choice of the people, the people who every day deal with bad socio-economic 
living conditions. It seems as if many African leaders are not ready to face that yet.  
 
5.7 Causal Factors: Socio-Economic Factors 
 
The socio-economic factor is the fourth factor of analysis. Although there are considerable 
differences in the socio-economic situations in Kenya and Zimbabwe – in the better for 
Kenya – both countries are struggling with poverty, unemployment and disease. In the case of 
Kenya, the poverty, inequalities and unemployment in the context of ethnic polarisation led 
presidential candidates and parties to populism and manipulation of the genuine economic 
grievances to win the vote of the poor. As mentioned earlier, Kibaki campaigned under the 
slogan ‘Let Kibaki Continue’, whereas the ODM campaigned under the motto of change. 
Although Kibaki did deliver on certain economic promises and improvements, corruption still 
overshadowed this. Certainly in a democracy there is no room for corruption.  
In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, it has been the conduct of President Mugabe, and 
President Mugabe only, which has devastated the Zimbabwean economy. This has been 
widely recognized by its people and even to such an extent that it is estimated that due to the 
economic and social circumstance in Zimbabwe around 3 million people have fled to South 
Africa alone. The major distinction to Kenya, however, can be found in the fact that although 
people protested, it was mainly President Mugabe’s wave of political violence against his 
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own people. The fact that the outcome of the elections with a 47.9 percent of votes for 
Tsvangirai against a 43.2 percent of votes for President Mugabe, caused a run-off which 
sparked the violence. The similarity between Kenya and Zimbabwe lay in the fact that both 
countries’ population voted for a new president, partly due to the miserable living conditions 
and with hope for better economic governance. This was especially made clear in the case of 
Kenya where Odinga in his acceptance speech as president for the ODM stated he wanted to 
end the ‘economic apartheid’.  
Socio-economic development is of vital importance to establish a democracy to its fullest 
ability. In a study done by Barrington Moore, an American sociologist, democracy is 
underpinned by ‘competition in ideas, vistas and voices at the social, economic and political 
levels, permitting regular changes in leadership, meaningful choices in the marketplace and 
freedoms that enshrine a whole array of individual and social rights’ (Khadiagala: in Mbeki, 
2011:189). His message further was that democracies are in fact built on ‘middle classes 
embedded in systems of property ownership (bourgeois) that dominate the social and 
economic spaces and influence political decisions in most industrialized economies’ 
(2011:189). Scholars have argued that it is indeed impossible to build a democracy on the 
backs of large peasantries who are often isolated from each other through limited 
infrastructure, cultural difference and regional differentiations. In other words, no bourgeois, 
no democracy (Khadiagala, in Mbeki, 2011:189).  
Additionally, education is an important factor for democracy and violence. For one, it has 
been proven that educated women are less prone to have big families. This might be an odd 
argument at first; however, when considering the struggle many African countries face with 
regards to overpopulation, the logic is evident. Overpopulation unmistakeably means scarcity 
of resources such as land. The conflict over land has been demonstrated to play a vital role in 
the electoral conflict in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, in a study done by the 
London School of Economics, the relation between a democracy and education is discussed. 
The relation between education and democracy is mutual. On the one hand, democratic 
regimes and their leaders are more triggered to provide for the basic need of education as they 
need the support of the people. On the other hand, educated people are more likely to actually 
support the political system of a democracy (Stasavage, 2005). Additionally, educated people 
are far less likely to turn to violence to make their voices heard. 
In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the socio-economic circumstances have thus had several 
influences on the electoral violence. For one, the longing for a new leader with new 
opportunities for a better life in an education, employment, medical care and so forth 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
 
perspective. Second, the fact that many people in Kenya and Zimbabwe suffer from a lack of 
education results in violence as their only means of acting out.  
 
5.8 Causal Factors: Ethnicity 
 
The fifth and last factor subject to analysis is ethnicity. As discussed, both Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have struggled for decades with this societal aspect in numerous ways.  
The difference between Kenya and Zimbabwe which is on the forefront is that Kenya’s 
ethnic society consists of numerous more ethnic groups than in Zimbabwe. Kenya knows 42 
ethnic groups; Zimbabwe on the other hand only two major groups, the Mashona and 
Ndebele. In Kenya, as discussed, no single ethnic group forms more than one quarter of all 
Kenyans. In Zimbabwe, in contrast, the Mashona consists of 75 percent of the Zimbabwean 
population, whereas the Ndebele consists of 20 percent of all Zimbabweans. Kenya’s colonial 
legacy with regards to the white settlers has had a great influence on ethnic conflicts. In 
Zimbabwe, the colonial legacy of white settlers is no different, albeit in contemporary 
Zimbabwe, it is still very present. 
In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe is the only president since independence; he is Shona. In 
Kenya, however, the powers have shifted somewhat between the different ethnic groups. See 
Table 6 for specifications. 
 
Table 6: Kenya Elections and Multi-Ethnic Party Coalitions, 1963 – 2007 
President Election Party and Main Ethnic Coalitions Impact on Democracy/Stability 
        
Jomo 
Kenyatta 1963 KANU (Kikuyu and Luo Victory, Relative stability 
  1969 (Kikuyu, Kalenjin) Authoritarianism, 
  1974   Relative Stability 
        
Daniel arap 
Moi 1979 KANU (Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya) Legitimacy and Relative Stability 
  1983 KANU (Kalenjin) Authoritarianism and Resistance 
  1988 KANU   
  1992 KANU (KAMUTUSA) Post-election violence and Instability 
  1997 KANU (KAMUTUSA) Election Violence and Instability 
        
Mwai Kibaki 2002 NARC (Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya) Victory over KANU and post-election stability 
  2007 PNU  (Kikuyu/Embu Meru, Luhya (Bukusu), Kisii) Post-election violence and instability 
 (Source: Kagwanja and Southall, 2009:259) 
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The difference can thus be found in the number of ethnic groups and the numbers in members 
of the different ethnic groups. The similarities between Kenya and Zimbabwe on ethnic 
electoral violence are however more prominent. 
As mentioned, colonizers in both the case of Kenya as Zimbabwe took the most fertile 
land, which caused the loss of land, business and home for numerous Africans. This in turn 
caused tensions and conflict between ethnic groups who were disowned of their land, in 
search of new fertile land. 
The electoral violence in 2007-2008 was certainly not the first clash in the history of 
Kenya and it is therefore argued that the violent conflict was the result of deep-rooted 
historical ethnic tensions. In 1992, the Maasai heavily clashed with Kikuyu immigrants and 
in 1997 in Likoni, in the Mombasa district, Coastal youths attacked non-indigenous residents, 
leaving approximately 100 dead and 100,000 misplaced (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009:269).  
In Zimbabwe, the ethnic situation is somewhat different. First of all, Zimbabwe has two 
larger ethnic groups with no real violent past. Second of all, the true ethnic conflict lay 
between the white and African populations. In Kenya, clearly there also were white settlers; 
however, the percentage of white settlers – farmers – which remained in Zimbabwe, and who 
actually hardly can be called settlers as they simply were born into the next generation in 
Zimbabwe, is much higher than in Kenya. In Kenya, there never was a policy to ‘remove’ the 
remaining white settlers. President Mugabe’s Land-reform Act however, which for a large 
part is responsible for the economic crisis, was directly aimed at whites. Nevertheless, two 
cases of ethnic ‘cleansing’ – to put it bluntly – are recorded in Zimbabwe’s history. As 
mentioned, the first is the Matableleland Massacres, or as it is better known, Gukurahundi, 
aimed at alleged dissidents and supporters of the then-called ZAPU, Mugabe’s main 
opposition party at the time. Secondly, the brutal Land Reform Act against the whites. 
Additionally, although not purely ethnical, the latest political violence stems from an 
operation called Mavhoterapapi, meaning ‘who did you vote for’.  
Ethnicity is in many cases, and certainly the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, an underlying 
factor for electoral violence. In Kenya it even turned into ethnic party politics. It is widely 
known that every ethnic group wants to be represented in government; not only because of 
loyalty, but prominently out of the fact that many African democracies still adhere to the 
concept of favouritism. The president’s ethnic group has more than once been proven to 
receive preferential treatments with highly economic benefits. Part of the ethnic clashes stem 
from the fact that members of the same ethnic group as the man in power were often 
unethically given or allowed to use land at the expense of other ethnic groups. The main 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
75 
 
victims or profiteers, whichever one applies, have been the Kikuyu, Maasai, Luo and 
Kalenjins. The main ethnic groups involved in the post-election violence were the Kikuyu, 
Luo and Kalenjin. 
The ‘art’ of African politics is therefore in many cases formulaic in the sense that once in 
power ‘the success or failure of the incumbent president, and indeed the legitimacy and 
stability of their governments, have largely been measured against their ability to cultivate 
and maintain the support of a broad, multi-ethnic group’ (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009:267). 
In the case of Zimbabwe, it seems as if President Mugabe is suffering from a severe addiction 
to his power combined with grievances towards the white population. The 2000 referendum 
for constitutional change introduced by President Mugabe was voted against. Not only did 
this mean a great loss of popular support for President Mugabe, it had a double effect as the  
‘no campaign’ led by the opposition was largely funded and partly organized by whites, his 
old enemies. The sequence of violence was directly aimed at this. As the funding came from 
the whites who gained their wealth from farming, they were the target and President Mugabe 
would go as far as devastating the economy to destroy the people who had dared to oppose 
him. He aimed at the source of their political power: money. In other words, he sent his ‘war-
veterans’ and plundered, beat, burned, and killed farmers and their farms. Where exactly the 
hate for whites stems from is unclear. Zimbabwe has acres and acres of highly fertile land; 
this could have been appointed to the Africans. It has therefore been unnecessary to re-claim 
highly successful farms. Dowden describes President Mugabe’s opposition to the West as 
complicated and a combination for the longing of belonging to the British civilization and 
being an Africa. Dowden writes, ‘Mugabe has not gone mad. Nor was he always bad. He is a 
complicated schizophrenic man, driven both by respect for the Western mentality for logic 
and order and a passionate sense of injustice and rejection by whites’  
 
(Dowden, 2009:145-146). In any case, in 2000, President Mugabe added clauses to the newly 
drafted constitution allowing the government to seize land without compensation. The 
Zimbabwean economy as a consequence collapsed bit by bit. The harsh economic 
circumstances drove out millions of Zimbabweans and accelerated the hope and wish for a 
new leader. President Mugabe, as he has stated on numerous occasions, is highly unlikely to 
surrender through losing in elections, or through anything for that matter.  
Ethnicity is a structural cause of violence, especially, but not only, during elections in 
Africa. The cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe, albeit in a slightly different form, have proven the 
seriousness of deeply rooted,  historically created, negative feelings and tensions between 
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ethnic groups. The fact that favouritism is high on the agenda of the governing elite also 
creates a fragile and explosive situation. 
 
5.9 Causal Factors: Further Analysis 
 
So far this thesis has mainly focused on Kenya and Zimbabwe and the causal factors of 
violence. However, another subject a bit more below the surface is regarding the African 
struggle with elections in particular. It is highly acknowledged that no country in Africa 
represents the whole continent. Kenya and Zimbabwe on their own are different countries, let 
alone comparing Libya to South Africa, or finding similarities between Angola and Egypt. 
One thing is a common feature; the majority of Africa gained independence in the 1960s and 
the transition to democracies in Africa started in the 1990s. One further fact is that African 
elections are generally characterized by violence. There are exceptions to the rule; however, 
recent elections actually indicate a resurgence of violence surrounding elections. The most 
recent one in Nigeria has proven the volatility of African societies. Table 7 presents an 
extensive overview of numerous African countries that held elections and Leonard studied 
the possible attributes to an election which could reduce election-related violence.  
 
Table 7: Evidence of Electoral Process Attributes that help to Reduce Election-Related Violence 
 Attribute  Confirming 
evidence: Present 
with Positive 
impact  
Confirming 
evidence: 
Absent with 
negative 
impact  
Other 
supporting 
evidence  
Disconfirming 
evidence  
1 ‘Free and Fair’ 
elections  
Namibia      
Burundi         
Ghana             
South Africa  
Kenya 2007       
Nigeria 2007 
 Absent but no violence: 
Mozambique 2005 
Rwanda 2008          
Present but some 
violence: Sierra- Leone 
2007  
2 Long term international 
assistance and pressure 
on electoral processes  
Burundi DRC 
Liberia 
Mozambique  
Zimbabwe 
2008  
Collier 2007, 
2009  Lindberg 
2006, 2009 
Leonard & 
Straus 2003  
Present but violence: 
Kenya 2007 Nigeria 
2007   
3 Cooperation with 
international electoral 
support missions  
Sierra Leone 
2007 DRC 2007     
Ghana 2006   
Kenya 2007       
Nigeria 2007 
Zimbabwe 
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Liberia 2005 2008  
4 Independence in the 
electoral management 
body (EMB)  
Botswana 2006 
DRC 2007  
Kenya 2007    
5 Independent and fair 
delimitation of 
constituency boundaries 
Mozambique 
2005 
DRC 2007  
Kenya 2007 
Nigeria 2007  
mixed 
  
6 Independent, speedy 
and substantively just 
adjudication of electoral 
disputes  
DRC   Leonard 2009   
7 Comprehensive and 
non-fraudulent voter 
registration  
DRC 2007   Reilly 2001  
8 Effective Monitoring 
and regulation of the 
media to prevent 
incitement  
Sierra Leone 
2007  
Kenya 2007    
9 Monitoring of political 
party activity to 
dissuade incitement to 
violence and mediate 
non-electoral disputes  
Sierra Leone 
2007  
Nigeria 2007 
Zimbabwe 
2008 
  
10 Non-partisan and 
effective policing of  
the voting process and 
the integrity of the 
ballot  
Ghana 2005  
Sierra Leone 
2007  
Nigeria 2007 
Zimbabwe 
2008 
  
11 Local pre-election 
peace committees  
Ghana 2005  Kenya 2007   
12 An electoral system that 
is resilient to polling 
station fraud  
 Kenya 2007 
Nigeria 2007 
Sierra Leone 
2007  
Molino 2006  
13 An electoral system that 
gives minority groups 
‘fair’ representation 
    
14 Non-partisan armed 
forces  
Kenya 2007 
Liberia 2005 
Sierra Leone 
2007 
DRC 2007  Collier 2007  Botswana Lindberg 
2006, 2009 
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15 Pre-election disarming 
of combatant groups 
seeking political power  
Sierra Leone 
2002,2007 
Liberia 2005 
DRC 2007 
Angola  
  
16 Assurance that the loser 
will have a fair chance 
to contest again  
Mozambique  Angola Sudan    
17 Protection into the 
future of the rights of 
minorities and losers  
Burundi 2005     
Source: Leonard, in Matlosa et al, 2009:46-47 
 
This study clarifies certain aspects about election violence in numerous African countries. 
Aside from the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe, it highlights that Namibia, Burundi, Ghana 
and South Africa kept peace as they conducted free and fair elections. International assistance 
deemed positive outcomes in the cases of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Liberia and Mozambique. Furthermore, independence of the electoral management 
body proved beneficial in Botswana and DRC and proved to have a negative impact where 
absent, such as in Kenya. Also, the assurance that losers will have a fair chance to contest 
again proved important in Mozambique, Angola and Sudan. Lastly, effective monitoring and 
regulation of the media to prevent incitement proved crucial in Sierra Leone and Kenya. 
The above illustrates that electoral violence occurs throughout the continent. Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, also showing in the above table, share similarities in the factors causing election 
violence. The colonial legacy seems to have been a great contributor to contemporary 
conflict; not only because of the ethnic tensions this created over land, but also due to the 
poor political states the colonizers left the respective countries at independence. The 
transition to democracies has not been successfully implemented, causing a lack of 
legitimacy and transparency. Additionally, socio-economic circumstances in both Kenya and 
Zimbabwe are underdeveloped, which in turn is troublesome for the development of 
democracy. The following concluding chapter will further elaborate on this. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
Election-related violence is increasingly common in the 21
st
 century, as are democratic 
regimes. Over the past 15 or so years, Africa has been engaged in building its democratic 
institutions and progress has been made. Nonetheless, the last several years have 
demonstrated the harsh consequences that the failure of democratic processes can have. The 
brutal violence during the 2011 elections in Nigeria is the latest example of the tremendous 
impact that poorly conducted elections can have on a society. Even though elections form 
only a part of a democratic regime, they are one of the fundamentals of a democracy.  
This thesis has researched the possible causal factors behind election violence through 
examining and comparing Kenya´s 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections and 
Zimbabwe´s 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. The specific research question is 
Why have presidential elections yielded so much violence in Africa in particular? Five 
specific factors were pointed out as guidelines to conduct the research: 1) free and fair 
elections, 2) political/electoral system, 3) international assistance, 4) socio-economic factors, 
and 5) ethnicity. The main aim was to find out if there are causal factors behind election-
related violence. 
A typology was presented with Khadiagala’s framework as a basis, that being electoral 
violence as a result of broader political conflicts and electoral violence as a result of 
imperfect electoral rules. Two additional features were classified; that being the timing or 
pre-election, election day and post-election violence, and the influence of international 
assistance. This conclusion will now discuss which one of these two classifications weighed 
the most, and which one of these were featured more prominently as causal factors in election 
violence. 
First it is specifically mentioned that the 21
st
 century election violence is heavy, partly due 
to the realization of the people that countries are being deprived of free and fair elections. It is 
not argued that this is a sole factor contributing to the violence, it is merely emphasized that 
in contemporary Africa, it seems as if people are fed up with stolen elections and they are 
demanding the free and fair conduct of elections. This is most likely related to the overall 
higher level of educated people then 20 years ago, but also the media and international 
knowledge plays a major role in the critical judgment of the people. 
Second, when evaluating the history of Kenya and Zimbabwe, a few similarities are noted 
which find relation to the respective election violence. Both countries are former British 
colonies and both countries suffer from the, then established, land distribution. The white 
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settlers took the most fertile land from the indigenous people. The consequence was two-fold. 
Firstly, the people whose land was taken severely slowed down in development. They had to 
start over again somewhere else, with possibly less fertile land. Secondly, as they had to 
move on, they clashed with other people who had established their own farms and 
communities on other land. Deeper social cleavages had thus already started to develop.  
Another legacy of the colonial rule is the little involvement that the indigenous people 
were allowed in political affairs. Directly related to electoral violence here, is the fact that 
before independence the people hardly knew or hardly had any experience in governing a 
country. This had been done ‘for them’ for decades. Not only was a new system introduced, 
the lack of knowledge on governing has also caused flaws in the system.    
 
The first causal factor discussed was free and fair elections. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe the 
elections were not free and fair. Both in Kenya and in Zimbabwe, suspicious activity was 
noticed in all three phases of the election. The pre-election period was marked by unfair 
distribution of broadcasting time in Zimbabwe and the use of state resources in Kenya. One 
difference which must be noted is the freedom of speech. This was highly more tolerated in 
Kenya then in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s pre-election climate was way more violent then 
Kenya’s. Although Kenya had not presented a transparent campaigning period and there are 
doubts on the freeness and fairness, violence was kept to a minimum. In Zimbabwe on the 
other hand, the intimidation by the ruling party towards both the voters as well as the 
opposition party of Morgan Tsvangirai was extremely high. On election day itself, both 
countries were marked by serious flaws in the system, but no true violence occurred during 
the casting of votes. The post-election period, however, was heavily violent. In Zimbabwe, 
the heavy delay of five weeks before announcing the results indicates serious rigging. 
Nevertheless, the difference to Kenya is, in Zimbabwe a run-off was announced and from that 
moment on the government initiated heavily violent campaigns to still win the run-off. The 
consequence was the withdrawal of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai as he witnessed the 
violence. This was thus more a top-down sequence of violence. In Kenya, the case is 
different. Minutes after the announcement of results, extreme violence broke out with specific 
ethnic groups as actors and targets. The only conclusion which can be drawn here is that 
Kenya’s violence was not completely aimed at flawed elections; the elections were merely a 
triggering factor for underlying broader ethnic and political conflict. The conclusion 
regarding Zimbabwe is somewhat more complicated as the violence mainly came from the 
government. It is difficult to classify into one of the two categories this thesis has suggested 
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as it seems as if President Mugabe struggles with deep historical and political issues mostly 
regarding ‘his’ land. The Zimbabwean people became the victim of imperfect electoral rules 
as 47.9 percent of Zimbabweans voted for Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round, after which 
President Mugabe announced run-off elections. The withdrawal of Morgan Tsvangirai due to 
uncontrollable governmental violence provided President Mugabe a staggering 90.22 percent 
win in the run-off elections. There is no arguing with these raw statistics; they indicate the 
flaws of the Zimbabwean system. 
  
Directly connected to this is the factor of political and electoral systems. In theory, both 
systems are fully accepted democratic systems and have full competency of proper 
functioning. In reality, both systems have shown severe flaws and the legal frameworks are 
lacking in legitimacy. In Kenya for example the length of the campaigning period is not 
regulated; in Zimbabwe the level of transparency is low. Most importantly maybe, the fact 
that neither Kenya nor Zimbabwe have implemented clear and functioning regulations to 
possible conflict resolution when/if election-related violence is likely to break out. This is 
considered a major causal factor for both Zimbabwe and Kenya.  Fischer’s statement is 
accurate in this case as he says, ‘an electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a 
means of achieving governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, 
unresponsive, or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are 
motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict 
and violence become tactics in political competition. Violence is not a result of an electoral 
process, it is rather the breakdown of an electoral process (Fischer, 2002:2).  
Khadiagala’s fourth wave of democratization in Africa is once again repeated here. The 
further strengthening, legitimizing and deepening of the African democratic institutions and 
systems are needed in order to further prevent electoral violence. The fact that both in Kenya 
and in Zimbabwe the systems show these errors and flaws, and the fact that both countries 
experienced heavy violence, connects the two and concluded is that this factor most certainly 
is a causal one. 
  
Through the use of international assistance, African countries could further strengthen their 
systems. Whether international assistance is a factor of electoral violence, or rather a 
preventative factor, is now discussed. In the case of Zimbabwe, international assistance was 
highly limited. In the case of Kenya it was present, although with a few limitations; the 
observers overall got insight into most of the process. The fact that both countries 
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experienced violence leaves to conclude that this is not a causal factor of election violence. If 
anything, this factor could only be embraced by countries to strengthen their democracy. 
However, as most African leaders hang on to their power, and especially because of fear of 
change and losing, keep away from any form of assistance. It is as Smith argues, ‘violence is 
due to a lack of constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of multiparty 
politics in the early 1990s. Electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of politics and 
therefore led to significant and escalating political violence (Smith, 2009:867). Exactly due to 
these heightened stakes of politics, the leading authority would rather keep out the 
international community then take up their advice and risk losing their position. So even 
though international assistance could only strengthen democracies leading to more free and 
fair elections without violence, the presence at the time of elections still seems to have little 
influence on the outbreak of violence. 
 
Regarding the socio-economic conditions and its relation to electoral violence, the following 
remarks are in place. It is, again, hard to determine whether or not it is a causal factor behind 
election-related violence as this factor might not explicitly relate to elections. Poverty, a lack 
of education and diseases are, for example, all factors that are related to government policy 
making. It has been discussed that both Kenya and Zimbabwe suffer from poor socio-
economic circumstances. In Zimbabwe this can directly be linked to President Mugabe’s poor 
land distribution act. In Kenya, efforts have been made with a certain level of success; 
however, it is also discussed that the country’s leaders are engaged in corrupt businesses. The 
obvious relation between socio-economic circumstances and election-related violence can be 
found in the ‘choice’ by the people for a new leader with the hope of improving living 
conditions. A new government will implement fresh and new policies to improve the 
country’s status and in that sense, when the current president is re-elected, people might 
express their disappointment through violence. This is a viscous circle as the analysis has 
indicated, a true democracy – which in turn is less prone to violence – can only be further 
consolidated when a middle class is established. Before concluding remarks will be made, 
ethnicity will be discussed as these factors turn out to be highly interlinked.  
  
This link is predominantly found when looking at the colonial history and the accompanying 
ethnic marginalization. As discussed, the economic development of the indigenous people of 
both Kenya and Zimbabwe stagnated considerably with the arrival of the colonizers. 
Additionally, ethnic clashes occurred over land as they were expelled from their own land 
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and went in a search of new land. The Kenyan ethnic composition is highly different from 
Zimbabwe, with Kenya having many more different ethnicities. It is fair to conclude that 
much of the underlying factors behind the electoral violence in Kenya were related to ethnic 
rivalry.  
In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, with only two major ethnic groups, the ethnic conflict 
was less the issue as this, to put it bluntly, was already dealt with during the so-called 
Gukurahundi. If any racial issues exist, it is more and more obvious that it is President 
Mugabe’s discontent towards the white population in Zimbabwe. Clearly, it has played a role 
in Zimbabwe, but it was not as dominantly present as in Kenya. Remarkable in Kenya is that 
it was not necessarily just the population itself which felt these conflictive feelings towards 
each other, it was largely ‘fed’ by the leaders of the country. As Rutten and Owuor quote an 
anonymous Kenyan ‘It would be a misreading of the situation to see the deep divisions 
among our people as a ‘natural’ outcome of endemic ‘tribalism’. Instead, our power-hungry 
leasders stirred up and used tribal sentiment when they found it convenient to do so’ (Rutten 
and Owuor, 2008:313). Both socio-economic factors and ethnicity are considered causal 
factors to election violence. It is a clear part of the first classification being that it is a part of 
broader political conflicts. 
 
Having evaluated the factors, the first and second categories of the typology seem utterly 
related. ‘In the first order of causes, electoral violence is the outcome of events and 
circumstances that emanate from broader political conflicts, particularly in societies that are 
beset by ethnic, communal and sectarian fissures. In the second category, electoral violence is 
a consequence of imperfect electoral rules; imperfections that allow some parties to 
manipulate elections through electoral fraud, vote buying and rigging’ (Khadiagala, 2010:17).  
The heavy burdens history has put on Kenyans and Zimbabweans are recalled during the 
times of elections. As seen in Kenya, 95 percent of Luo – Odinga’s ethnic background – did 
not think of the elections as free and fair. However, 67 percent of Kikuyu judged them to be 
honest. With opinions this strong and this far apart, it is clear that the factors behind the 
extreme violence in Kenya were a mix between ethnic marginalization and a flawed electoral 
system.  
Zimbabwe’s legacy of colonialism and the cruel land-reforms show the broad political 
conflict of the country. Additionally, the fact that an almost 50-50 division of the votes cast 
turned into a 90.22 percent win for President Mugabe indicates severe flaws in the electoral 
system. 
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Africa’s potential to establish solid and peaceful democracies is enormous. With explosions 
such as Kenya and Zimbabwe’s violence, and more recently, Nigeria’s extreme election 
violence, doubt is presented as to whether or not Africa can ever get there. However, Africa’s 
transition process has been a hasty one and an enforced one. More attention needs to be given 
to the rules and regulations of a democracy. The connection between social and economic 
differences to the electoral system recognizes that further deepening and strengthening of the 
democratic institutions needs to become a reality. Even though a democracy may not unite all 
different people, it will provide for a climate in which everybody can live together peacefully.   
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